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caused or deterred cannot be reliably disentangled from the large year-to-year changes in the homicide rate
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INTRODUCTION 
Over much of the last half-century, the legal and political history of the 
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death penalty in the United States has closely paralleled the debate within 
social science about its efficacy as a deterrent. Sociologist Thorsten Sellin’s 
careful comparisons of the evolution of homicide rates in contiguous states 
from 1920 to 1963 led to doubts about the existence of a deterrent effect caused 
by the imposition of the death penalty.1 This work likely contributed to the 
waning reliance on capital punishment, and executions virtually ceased in the 
late 1960s. In the 1972 Furman decision, the Supreme Court ruled that existing 
death penalty statutes were unconstitutional.2 In 1975, Isaac Ehrlich’s analysis 
of national time-series data led him to claim that each execution saved eight 
lives.3 Solicitor General Robert Bork cited Ehrlich’s work to the Supreme 
Court a year later, and the Court, while claiming not to have relied on the 
empirical evidence, ended the death penalty moratorium when it upheld various 
capital punishment statutes in Gregg v. Georgia and related cases.4 The 
injection of Ehrlich’s conclusions into the legal and public policy arenas, 
coupled with the academic debate over Ehrlich’s methods, led the National 
Academy of Sciences to issue a 1978 report which argued that the existing 
evidence in support of a deterrent effect of capital punishment was 
unpersuasive.5 Over the next two decades, as a series of academic papers 
continued to debate the deterrence question, the number of executions 
gradually increased, albeit to levels much lower than those seen in the first half 
of the twentieth century. 
The current state of the political debate over capital punishment is one of 
disagreement, controversy, and division. Governor George Ryan of Illinois 
suspended executions in that state in 2000 and commuted the death sentences 
of all Illinois death row inmates in 2003.6 As a number of other jurisdictions 
were considering similar moratoria, New York’s highest court ruled in 2004 
 
1. Thorsten Sellin, Homicides in Retentionist and Abolitionist States, in CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 135 (Thorsten Sellin ed., 1967) [hereinafter Sellin, Homicides]; see also 
Thorsten Sellin, Experiments with Abolition, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra, at 122. 
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
3. Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Matter of Life and 
Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975). 
4. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, Justice Stewart stated, 
“Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may not function as a 
significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical evidence 
either supporting or refuting this view.” Id. at 185. Yet, he then asserted: “We may 
nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in passion, for 
whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death 
penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent.” Id. Justice Stewart did not clarify whether he 
believed that murders would increase if convicted murderers who might otherwise be 
executed instead received sentences of life without parole and, if so, on what basis this might 
be safely assumed. 
5. NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE 
EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978) 
[hereinafter DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION]. 
6. John Biemer, Death Penalty Reforms Lauded, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 2003, at M1. 
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that the state’s death penalty statute was unconstitutional.7 Executions in 
California are virtually nonexistent, although the state continues to add 
prisoners to death row at a rapid pace.8 Meanwhile, executions continue apace 
in Texas, which accounts for over one-third of all post-Gregg executions.9 
A host of more recent academic studies has examined the death penalty 
over the last decade, with mixed results. While Lawrence Katz, Steven Levitt, 
and Ellen Shustorovich found no robust evidence of deterrence,10 several 
researchers claim to have uncovered compelling evidence to the contrary.11 
This latter research appears to have found favor with Cass Sunstein and Adrian 
Vermeule, who describe it as “powerful”12 and “impressive,”13 and they refer 
to “many decades’ worth of data about [capital punishment’s] deterrent 
effects.”14 While Sunstein and Vermeule claim not to endorse any specific 
analysis, these “sophisticated multiple regression studies”15 are “[t]he 
foundation for [their] argument,”16 and they specifically rely on many of the 
recent studies that we will reexamine as buttressing their premise that “capital 
 
7. William Glaberson, 4-3 Ruling Effectively Halts Death Penalty in New York, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 25, 2004, at A1. 
8. By the end of 2004, California’s death row population was the highest in the country 
(637 inmates). See THOMAS P. BONCZAR & TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2004, at 1 (2005). 
9. See id. at 9. 
10. Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt & Ellen Shustorovich, Prison Conditions, Capital 
Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 (2003).  
11. See Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Does Capital 
Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344 (2003); H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: 
Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 453, 
453 (2003); Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of 
Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163, 163 (2004).  
Joanna Shepherd, an author of several studies finding a deterrent effect, has recently 
argued before Congress that recent research has created a “strong consensus among 
economists that capital punishment deters crime,” going so far as to claim that “[t]he studies 
are unanimous.” Terrorist Penalties Enhancement Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2934 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 10-11 (2004), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/ 
printers/108th/93224.pdf. Upon further probing from the committee chairman about “the 
findings of anti-death penalty advocates that are 180 degrees from your conclusions,” id. at 
24, Shepherd responded: 
There may be people on the other side that rely on older papers and studies that use outdated 
statistical techniques or older data, but all of the modern economic studies in the past decade 
have found a deterrent effect. So I am not sure what the other people are relying on. 
Id.  
12. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? 
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706 (2005) (in this Issue). 
13. Id. at 713. 
14. Id. at 737. 
15. Id. at 711. 
16. Id. at 706. 
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punishment powerfully deters killings.”17 This empirical evidence leads to the 
heart of their claim that it would be irresponsible for government to fail to act 
upon the studies and vigorously prosecute the death penalty. Carol Steiker has 
offered a considered response to this claim based on moral theory;18 by 
contrast, we are interested in exploring its empirical premise. 
Thus, our aim in this Article is to provide a thorough assessment of the 
statistical evidence on this important public policy issue and to understand 
better the conflicting evidence. We test the sensitivity of existing studies in a 
number of intuitively plausible ways—testing their robustness to alternative 
sample periods, comparison groups, control variables, functional forms, and 
estimators. We find that the existing evidence for deterrence is surprisingly 
fragile, and even small changes in specifications yield dramatically different 
results. Our key insight is that the death penalty—at least as it has been 
implemented in the United States since Gregg ended the moratorium on 
executions—is applied so rarely that the number of homicides it can plausibly 
have caused or deterred cannot be reliably disentangled from the large year-to-
year changes in the homicide rate caused by other factors. Our estimates 
suggest not just “reasonable doubt” about whether there is any deterrent effect 
of the death penalty, but profound uncertainty. We are confident that the effects 
are not large, but we remain unsure even of whether they are positive or 
negative. The difficulty is not just one of statistical significance: whether one 
measures positive or negative effects of the death penalty is extremely sensitive 
to very small changes in econometric specifications. Moreover, we are 
pessimistic that existing data can resolve this uncertainty. 
We begin in the next Part by sketching the relevant economic theories of 
crime and the difficulties in identifying their effects. We then begin our tour of 
the statistical evidence. Part II analyzes aggregate time-series evidence. Part III 
analyzes first differences—the change in homicide rates that occurs following 
death penalty reforms. In Part IV, we turn to panel data analysis, and Part V 
analyzes the key instrumental variables estimates. Part VI contains our attempt 
at reconciling the conflicting evidence, assessing the limited precision with 
which we might be able to pin down the deterrent effect of the death penalty 
with existing data. Our organizing theme involves an attempt to examine the 
evidence compiled by previous scholars with the aim of highlighting the ways 
in which this evidence can both provide insight but also potentially mislead 
policy analysts. 
 
17. Id. at 738. 
18. Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, 
Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2005) (in this Issue). 
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I. THEORY: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR 
HOMICIDE RATES? 
The theoretical premise underlying the deterrence argument is simple: raise 
the price of murder for criminals, and you will get less of it. In general, the 
death penalty raises the price of homicide as long as execution is worse than 
life imprisonment for most potential murderers.19  
While this argument is qualitatively reasonable, its quantitative 
significance may be minor. In 2003, there were 16,503 homicides (including 
nonnegligent manslaughter), but only 144 inmates were sentenced to death.20 
Moreover, of the 3374 inmates on death row at the beginning of the year, only 
65 were executed.21 Thus, not only did very few homicides lead to a death 
sentence, but the prospect of execution did not greatly affect the life expectancy 
of death row inmates. Indeed, Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich have made this 
point quite directly, arguing that “the execution rate on death row is only twice 
the death rate from accidents and violence among all American men” and that 
the death rate on death row is plausibly lower than the death rate of violent 
criminals not on death row.22 As such they conclude that “it is hard to believe 
that in modern America the fear of execution would be a driving force in a 
rational criminal’s calculus.”23 Moreover, even if there were a deterrent effect, 
capital punishment is sufficiently expensive24 that it may potentially divert 
 
19. The general rule is subject to a caveat. Once a criminal has already committed 
enough murders to get the maximum penalty, marginal deterrence is lost by a death penalty 
regime. At that point, the cost of killing to avoid capture goes to zero, and the death penalty 
may increase incentives to kill to avoid execution. 
20. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2003), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/03cius.htm; see also BONCZAR & SNELL, supra note 8, 
at 1. 
21. BONCZAR & SNELL, supra note 8, at 1.  
22. Katz, Levitt & Shustorovich, supra note 10, at 318-19.  
23. Id. at 320. On the other hand, even if criminals are not effective calculators, the 
vivid character of the death penalty might give criminals pause to a greater degree than its 
likely risk of implementation alone would warrant. The recent literature suggests two 
possibilities: (1) many individuals treat events with small likelihoods of occurrence as 
having zero probability, which would mean that the highly unlikely event of execution 
would essentially have a zero possibility of deterring instead of just a very small likelihood 
of deterring; and (2) certain catastrophic events that occur with low frequency are given 
greater prominence in decisionmaking than their likelihood warrants if individuals are given 
frequent vivid reminders of these events, which could conceivably make the death penalty 
more of a deterrent than a rational calculation of the risk such as that offered by Katz, Levitt, 
and Shustorovich would suggest. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 351 (4th ed. 2004). Again, only empirical investigation can answer the question 
of which effect would be more dominant on potential murderers. 
24. Public Policy Choices and Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Critical Review of 
New Evidence: Hearing on H. B. 3834 Before the Joint Comm. on Judiciary of Mass. Leg. 
(July 14, 2005) (statement of Jeffrey Fagan) [hereinafter Fagan Statement] (citing an array of 
studies documenting the high cost of capital cases compared to a sentence of life without 
parole), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/MassTestimonyFagan.pdf. 
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resources away from more effective crime prevention strategies. 
A more sociological approach notes that there may be social spillovers as 
state-sanctioned executions cheapen the value of life, potentially demonstrating 
that deadly retribution is socially acceptable. Thus, executions may actually 
stimulate more homicide through the so-called “brutalization effect.”25 With 
theory inconclusive, we now turn to examining the data. 
II. A CENTURY OF MURDERS AND EXECUTIONS 
Several of the early studies of the death penalty were based on analysis of 
the aggregate U.S. time-series data. Figure 1 depicts the homicide and 
execution rates for the United States over the last century.26 Because data 
issues can be a concern with crime data, we present two series for homicides—
one from the Uniform Crime Reports and the other compiled from Vital 
Statistics sources, based on death certificates.27 
No clear correlation between homicides and executions emerges from this 
long time series. In the first decade of the twentieth century, execution and 
homicide rates seemed roughly uncorrelated, followed by a decade of 
divergence as executions fell sharply and homicides trended up. Then for the 
next forty years, execution and homicide rates again tended to move together—
first rising together during the 1920s and 1930s, and then falling together in the 
1940s and 1950s. As the death penalty fell into disuse in the 1960s, the 
homicide rate rose sharply. The death penalty moratorium that began with 
Furman in 1972 and ended with Gregg in 1976 appears to have been a period 
in which the homicide rate rose. The homicide rate then remained high and 
variable through the 1980s while the rate of executions rose. Finally, homicides 
dropped dramatically during the 1990s. By any measure, the resumption of the 
death penalty in recent decades has been fairly minor, and both the level of the 
execution rate and its year-to-year changes are tiny: since 1960 the proportion 
of homicides resulting in execution ranged from 0% to 3%. By contrast, there 
was much greater variation in execution rates over the previous sixty years, 
when the execution rate ranged from 2.5% to 18%. This immediately hints 
that—even with modern econometric methods—it is unlikely that the last few 
 
25. William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization? What Is the 
Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453 (1980); see also Steiker, supra note 18, at 
786-89 (discussing the “brutalization effect” as initially brought up in Sunstein and 
Vermeule’s article (Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 713 n.37, 745 & n.125)). 
26. The execution data come from the Espy file. See M. WATT ESPY & JOHN ORTIZ 
SMYKLA, ICPSR STUDY NO. 8451, EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1608-2002: THE 
ESPY FILE (2004) [hereinafter ESPY FILE], available at http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/ 
cocoon/NACJD-STUDY/08451.xml. 
27. Given the incomplete nature of Vital Statistics reporting in the first half of the 
century, we rely on Douglas Eckberg’s estimates of the homicide rate. See Douglas Lee 
Eckberg, Estimates of Early Twentieth-Century U.S. Homicide Rates: An Econometric 
Forecasting Approach, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 1 (1995). 
DONOHUE & WOLFERS 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 1/9/2006 12:41:22 PM 
December 2005] USES AND ABUSES OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 797 
decades generated enough variation in execution rates to overturn earlier 
conclusions about the deterrent effect of capital punishment. 
This simple chart reconciles many of the conflicting results from the death 
penalty literature. Ehrlich’s provocative 1975 paper argued that he could isolate 
the movements in the homicide rate caused by changing execution policies, 
concluding that each execution deterred an average of eight homicides.28 
Passell and Taylor showed that Ehrlich’s result relied heavily on movements 
from 1963 to 1969.29 When they limited the Ehrlich model to the period from 
1935 to 1962, they found no deterrent effect.30 Indeed, this led the subsequent 
National Academy of Sciences report to argue that “the real contribution to the 
strength of Ehrlich’s statistical findings lies in the simple graph of the upsurge 
of the homicide rate after 1962, coupled with the fall in the execution rate in the 
same period.”31 While Ehrlich’s contribution involved a sophisticated 
econometric technique, the National Academy report went on to note that his 
“whole statistical story lies in this simple pairing of these observations and not 
in the theoretical utility model, the econometric type specification, or the use of 
best econometric method. Everything else is relatively superficial and 
 
28. Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 414.  
29. Peter Passell & John B. Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: 
Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 445 (1977). 
30. Id. at 447.  
31. Lawrence R. Klein et al., The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An 
Assessment of the Estimates, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra note 5, at 336, 344. 
Ehrlich's sample
Passell & Taylor's sample
Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd's sample
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dominated by this simple statistical observation.”32 
Most recently, Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd have analyzed national time-
series data from 1960 to 2000. In light of Figure 1, it is not surprising that they 
find a strong negative relationship between executions and the homicide rate.33 
While they do not report their results in terms of lives saved per execution, 
their estimates suggest that each execution reduces the homicide rate by about 
0.05 homicides per 100,000 people, which translates to around 150 (!) fewer 
homicides per execution. 
Why does the correlation between executions and homicides vary so much 
over time? One possibility is simply that the deterrent effect has truly changed 
over time and that capital punishment has suddenly become very effective 
starting in the 1990s. If so, more recent estimates are obviously to be preferred. 
If anything, however, administration of the death penalty has become both 
slower and execution methods less vivid, which would lead one to expect that 
any deterrent effect would be weakened in this period. Alternatively it may be 
that despite efforts in all of these studies to control for a range of social and 
economic trends, other omitted factors are preventing the relationship between 
executions and homicides from being correctly captured. To illustrate that these 
factors are indeed omitted from national time-series analyses, we introduce 
comparison groups into the analysis. 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPARISON GROUPS 
As economists have come to understand how difficult it is to control 
convincingly for all relevant factors, many have lost faith in the ability of pure 
time-series analysis to isolate causal relationships. An alternative approach 
borrows a page from medical studies, emphasizing the importance of 
comparing results among those groups or regions receiving the “treatment” of 
the death penalty with a comparison group that is untreated, but otherwise 
susceptible to similar influences (a “placebo” or “control group”). If the 
execution rate is driving the homicide rate, then one should not expect to see a 
similar pattern in the homicide time series for these comparison groups. 
A. Canada Versus the United States 
Given its proximity and different pattern of reliance on capital punishment, 
Canada presents an interesting comparison group for the United States, and 
Figure 2 compares the evolution of their homicide rates through time. The 
 
32. Id. 
33. Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of Capital 
Punishment: Evidence from a “Judicial Experiment” tbls.3 & 4 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n 
Working Paper No. 18, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1017&context=alea (last visited Dec. 4, 2005). 
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Canadian homicide rate (right axis) is roughly one-third as high and one-third 
as variable as the rate in the United States (left axis). 
The most striking finding is that the homicide rate in Canada has moved in 
virtual lockstep with the rate in the United States, while approaches to the death 
penalty have diverged sharply. Both countries employed the death penalty in 
the 1950s, and the homicide trends were largely similar. However, in 1961, 
Canada severely restricted its application of the death penalty (to those who 
committed premeditated murder and murder of a police officer only); in 1967, 
capital punishment was further restricted to apply only to the murder of on-duty 
law enforcement personnel.34 As a result of these restrictions, no executions 
have occurred in Canada since 1962. Nonetheless, homicide rates in both the 
United States and Canada continued to move in lockstep. The Furman case 
in 1972 led to a death penalty moratorium in the United States. While many 
death penalty advocates attribute the subsequent sharp rise in homicides to this 
moratorium, a similar rise is equally evident in Canada, which was obviously 
unaffected by this U.S. Supreme Court decision. In 1976, the capital 
punishment policies of the two countries diverged even more sharply: the 
Gregg decision led to the reinstatement of the death penalty in the United 
States, while the death penalty was dropped from the Canadian criminal code.35 
Over the subsequent two decades, homicide rates remained high in the United 
 
34. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE OF CANADA, FACT SHEET: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CANADA 
(providing information on the history of the death penalty in Canada), available at 
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/fs/2003/doc_30896.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2005). 
35. JOHN W. EKSTEDT & CURT T. GRIFFITHS, CORRECTIONS IN CANADA: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 402 (2d ed. 1988). 
Figure 2. Homicide Rates and the Death Penalty in the United States and Canada 
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States while they fell in Canada. It is only over the last decade that homicide 
rates have started to decline in the United States, a fact that is difficult to 
attribute to reforms occurring decades earlier. 
The Canadian move towards abolition is also interesting because it 
represented a major policy shock: prior to abolition, the proportion of 
murderers executed in Canada was considerably higher than that in the United 
States.36 Of course, one might still be concerned that Canada is not quite an 
appropriate comparison group—perhaps Canada-specific factors were driving 
its homicide rate down following the abolition of its death penalty, back up 
during the U.S. moratorium, and back down over the ensuing period—
effectively hiding the effects of execution-related changes. As such, it might be 
worth considering an alternative comparison group that is more clearly subject 
to the same set of economic and social trends. 
B. Non-Death Penalty States Versus Other States in the United States 
Naturally, those states that have never had the death penalty should be 
unaffected by changes in death penalty policy throughout the rest of the 
country. Figure 3 facilitates the comparison of homicide rates across states that 
should be influenced by changes in death penalty law and practice from those 
that should not. 
We begin by considering the cleanest comparison group: there are six 
states that have not had the death penalty on the books at any point in our 1960 
to 2000 sample. Deterrence in these states was unaffected by either the Gregg 
or Furman decisions, and hence homicide rates in these states are a useful 
baseline for comparing the evolution of the homicide rates in other states. The 
remaining states are considered “treatment” states because either Gregg 
abolished their existing death penalties or Furman enabled their subsequent 
reinstatement (or, more commonly, both). Again, the most striking finding is 
 
36. A comparison of the Canadian abolition experiment with the post-Furman Texas 
experiment is instructive. Over the two decades prior to abolition, the annual number of 
homicides in Canada fluctuated from around 150 to 250. See Homicides, DAILY, Oct. 1, 
2003, available at http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/031001/d031001a.htm. From the 
1970s to the 1990s, the number of murders in Texas was about ten times larger, fluctuating 
from 1200 to 2500 per year, despite having only half the population of Canada. See FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 20, at 15.  
However, the number of executions was fairly similar: roughly seven per year in both 
Canada and Texas during the respective periods. Specifically, Canada had 148 executions for 
the years 1943 to 1962 (two decades before the policy change), or an average of 7.4 
executions per year. See Richard Clark, Executions in Canada from Confederation to 
Abolition, available at http://www.geocities.com/richard.clark32@btinternet.com/canada. 
html (last visited Nov. 21, 2005). From 1977 to 1996 (two decades after the moratorium), 
Texas averaged seven executions per year. See ESPY FILE, supra note 26. As a result, the 
change in the likelihood that a homicide would result in execution caused by the Canadian 
death penalty abolition is an order of magnitude larger than that caused by Texas’s 
reinstatement.  
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the close co-movement of homicide rates in these two groups of states. Both 
sets of states experienced higher homicide rates during the death penalty 
moratorium than over the subsequent decade; the gap widened for the 
subsequent decade and narrowed only in the late 1990s. It is very difficult to 
find evidence of deterrence in these Supreme Court-mandated natural 
experiments that the death penalty has any causal effects at all on the homicide 
rate. Clearly, most of the action in homicide rates in the United States is 
unrelated to capital punishment. 
The lesson from examining these time-series data is that it is crucial to take 
account of the fact that most of the variation in homicide rates is driven by 
factors that are common to both death penalty and non-death penalty states, and 
to both the United States and Canada. The empirical difficulty is that these 
factors may be spuriously correlated with executions, and hence the plausibility 
of any attempt to isolate the causal effect of executions rests heavily on either 
finding useful comparison groups or convincingly controlling for these other 
factors. 
This issue is particularly relevant to Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd’s analysis 
of changes in capital punishment laws. These authors present a series of before-
and-after comparisons, focusing only on states that abolished the death 
penalty37 or only on states adopting the death penalty.38 Unfortunately, by 
 
37. Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra note 33, at tbl.5. 
38. Id. at tbl.6. 
Figure 3. Homicide Rates in the United States
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focusing only on the states experiencing these reforms, the authors risk 
confounding the effects of changes in capital punishment laws with broader 
forces that are equally evident in homicide data in states not experiencing these 
reforms. 
The analysis by Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd is reproduced in Panel A of 
Table 1. The authors analyze each change in state laws during the sample. For 
each instance in which the death penalty was abolished, they compare the 
homicide rate one year prior to and one year after the abolition and report the 
average and median percentage change across all such abolitions. They also 
repeat this analysis for two- and three-year windows and for those times in 
which the death penalty was reinstated. Panel A exactly reproduces the 
numbers from their study, while Panel B shows our attempt at replicating their 
analysis.39 In each case, they find that the abolition of the death penalty was 
associated with rising homicide rates, and the reinstatement of the death 
penalty was associated with falling homicide rates. Our replication largely 
succeeds in generating similar estimates: abolition of the death penalty is 
associated with a 10% to 20% increase in homicide, while reinstatement is 
associated with a 5% to 10% decrease. 
However, these calculations may be confounding the effects of abolition or 
reinstatement of the death penalty with other broader trends. To test for this, we 
provide a comparison group for the abolition states in Panels A and B: we 
collect data on the change in homicide rates in all states that did not abolish the 
death penalty in that year.40 These states did not experience any reform and so 
constitute a natural control group. Comparing Panel B with Panel C shows that 
the measured “effects” in states that changed their death penalty laws are 
similar to those in states that did not. Indeed, some of the “effects” in the 
comparison states are larger than those in the treatment states. 
Panel D in Table 1 shows this formally, computing the difference between 
means (or medians) in treatment and control states—effectively a difference-in-
differences approach. In no case do the figures in Panel D provide statistically 
or economically significant evidence for or against the deterrent effect. Half of 
the six estimates of the effects of abolition are positive and half are negative; 
the same is true for the effects of reinstating the death penalty. None of the 
estimates in Panel D are statistically significant. In sum, this analysis provides 
no evidence that the death penalty affects homicide rates and does not even 
paint a consistent picture of whether it is more likely to raise or lower rates. 
 
39. They drop outliers from their calculation of the means, and we follow them in 
doing so; the medians are obviously more robust to such outliers. We were best able to 
match their numbers by assuming that North Dakota had capital punishment until Furman, 
although this seems a questionable judgment. Unfortunately, we cannot be confident of their 
coding because the authors were unwilling to share their data with us. 
40. See infra Table 1, Panel C (the “control” states). Similarly, we collect the 
appropriate comparison groups for the states that reinstated the death penalty. 
DONOHUE & WOLFERS 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 1/9/2006 12:41:22 PM 
December 2005] USES AND ABUSES OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 803 
Table 1: Estimating How Changes in Death Penalty Laws Effect Murder: Selected 
Before and After Comparisons: 1960-2000 
Dependent Variable: % Change in State Murder Rates Around Regime Changes 
 Death Penalty Abolition Death Penalty Reinstatement 
 
1-Year 
Window 
(1) 
2-Year 
Window 
(2) 
3-Year 
Window 
(3) 
1-Year 
Window 
(4) 
2-Year 
Window 
(5) 
3-Year 
Window 
(6) 
 
Panel A: Reproducing Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd Tables 5, 6 
Mean Change 10.1%
***
 
(2.8) 
16.3%*** 
(2.2) 
21.9%*** 
(2.5) 
-6.3%** 
(3.4) 
-6.4%** 
(2.9) 
-4.1% 
(2.9) 
Median Change 8.3% 14.9% 18.4% -9.3% -6.8% -7.5% 
Number of States 
Where Homicide 
Increased 
33/45 39/45 41/45 12/41 16/39 13/39 
 
Panel B: Our Replication: Changes Around Death Penalty 
Shifts (Treatment) 
Mean Change 10.1%
***
 
(2.9) 
16.0%*** 
(2.3) 
21.5%*** 
(2.6) 
-6.3%* 
(3.4) 
-7.0%** 
(2.9) 
-3.8% 
(2.9) 
Median Change 8.5% 13.8% 18.5% -9.3% -8.5% -7.4% 
Number of States 
Where Homicide 
Increased 
35/46 39/46 41/46 12/41 15/39 14/39 
 
Panel C: Our Innovation: Changes in Comparison States 
(Control) 
Mean Change 8.7%
***
 
(0.5) 
16.0%*** 
(0.8) 
20.6%*** 
(1.1) 
-7.5%*** 
(1.5) 
-6.6%*** 
(1.5) 
-3.7%*** 
(1.3) 
Median Change 8.5% 16.1% 20.9% -11.5% -9.8% -5.2% 
Number of States 
Where Homicide 
Increased 
44/46 44/46 44/46 7/41 8/39 8/39 
 
Panel D: Difference-in-Difference Estimates  
(Treatment-Control) 
Mean Change 1.4% (2.9) 
-0.1% 
(2.4) 
0.9% 
(2.8) 
1.2% 
(3.7) 
-0.5% 
(3.2) 
-0.1% 
(3.2) 
Median Change <0.001% (2.7) 
-2.3% 
(2.5) 
-2.4% 
(3.6) 
2.2% 
(3.5) 
1.3% 
(4.5) 
-2.2% 
(2.0) 
Notes: Sources, data, and specification are as described in Dezhbakhsh & 
Shepherd, supra note 33, at tbls.5-6. Standard errors are in parentheses, and 
standard errors on median change are estimated by bootstrap. ***, **, and * 
denote statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Panel A 
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estimates are evaluated using a one-tailed test, which makes it easier to find 
statistically significant evidence of deterrence. The rest of Table 1 follows our 
more conventional assumption that death penalty effects should be evaluated 
using a two-tailed test (thereby testing for either deterrence or antideterrence). 
 Each cell reports the mean or median percentage change in homicide rates 
in states that either abolished or reinstated the death penalty. The one-year 
window reports how murder rates changed from one year before abolition or 
reinstatement to one year after; the two-year window is the change in the 
homicide rate over the two years subsequent to reform compared to the two 
years before, with similar calculations for the three-year window. Panel A and 
our replication in Panel B might seem to suggest that crime rises when the 
death penalty is abolished and falls when it is reinstated, but Panel C shows 
that the same changes in murder rates also occur in the states that do not alter 
their death penalty laws (the control group). Panel D shows no differential 
change in murder rates between the treatment (change in death penalty law) 
and control groups (no change in death penalty law). 
 
The estimates in Table 1 involve direct comparison of treatment and 
control states, but they do not account for other factors that may have affected 
the homicide rate differently in each state. This suggests that a panel data 
analysis may provide more reliable estimates. Sunstein and Vermeule argue 
that “a significant body of recent evidence [shows] that capital punishment may 
well have a deterrent effect, possibly a quite powerful one” and that “[a] wave 
of sophisticated multiple regression studies have exploited a newly available 
form of data, so-called ‘panel data,’ that uses all information from a set of units 
(states or counties) and follows that data over an extended period of time.”41 
With this motivation, we now turn to expanding the above analysis into a 
formal panel structure. 
IV. PANEL DATA METHODS 
The simplest panel data extension to the previous analysis above involves 
running the regression: 
s ,t
1 s ,t s t s ,t s ,t
s ts ,t
Murders
Death Penalty Law State Effects Time Effects Controls( Population / 100,000 ) β λ ε= + + + +∑ ∑
 
where the dependent variable is the homicide rate in a given state and year, and 
the variable of interest is an indicator set equal to one when a state has an active 
death penalty law. As such, β1 measures the effects on the homicide rate of a 
state having a death penalty law in place. The inclusion of state fixed effects 
controls for persistent differences across states, the time fixed effects control 
for national time trends that are common across states, and control variables 
include indicators of state economic conditions, demographics, and law 
enforcement variables. Following Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd, we restrict our 
 
41. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 706, 711. 
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sample to the period from 1960 to 2000 and run a weighted least squares 
regression, clustering standard errors at the state level. 
In Column 1 of Table 2, we report the results from Dezhbakhsh and 
Shepherd’s estimation, in which they estimate the above equation without year 
fixed effects, but controlling for decade fixed effects.42 Column 2 shows our 
replication attempt based on independently collected data (but using the same 
sources).43 While our coefficient estimates do not precisely match theirs, the 
difference is tolerable. The real difference comes in the estimate of the standard 
error (which speaks to the persuasiveness of the data): we report a standard 
error nearly three times larger than theirs, and hence our coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. We do not know for certain the source of this 
divergence, and the authors provided no useful guidance. Thus, despite their 
claims that their estimates of “standard errors are further corrected for possible 
clustering effects—dependence within clusters (groups),”44 our best guess is 
that they report simple ordinary least squares (OLS) standard errors. As 
Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan show, using OLS 
standard errors in panel estimation involving autocorrelated data may severely 
understate the standard deviation of the estimators (and hence exaggerate 
claims of statistical significance).45 
Given the importance of not confounding overall crime trends in the 1970s 
with changes in death penalty laws (a lesson illustrated sharply in Table 1), we 
add controls for year fixed effects in Column 3. Indeed, in failing to control for 
year fixed effects, Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd’s study is a clear outlier in the 
literature.46 This is important: as Figure 2 shows, homicide rates were higher 
during the death penalty moratorium than during the early or late 1970s, and so 
simply controlling for the average crime rate in the 1970s would lead the 
 
42. It is easy to lose this point: Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd refer only to controlling for 
“time-specific binary variables,” and it was only through corresponding with the authors that 
we understood this to mean decade rather than year fixed effects. Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, 
supra note 33, at 18. Indeed, they never use the term “decade” in connection with their 
econometric specification. 
43. While Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd were unwilling to share their data for this Article, 
we have reconstructed it as closely as possible using the sources noted in their data appendix. 
44. Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra note 33, at 17. 
45. Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We 
Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q. J. ECON. 249 (2004). 
46. Papers using year fixed effects include: Dezhbakhsh, Rubin & Shepherd, supra 
note 11; Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment’s 
Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203 (2005) [hereinafter Shepherd, 
Deterrence Versus Brutalization]; Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution 
Delays, and the Deterrence of Capital Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2004) 
[hereinafter Shepherd, Murders of Passion]; Zimmerman, supra note 11. Mocan & Gittings, 
supra note 11, both include year fixed effects and control for state-specific time trends. Katz, 
Levitt & Shustorovich, supra note 10, control for year fixed effects and, in various 
specifications, also control for state-specific trends, state-decade interactions, and separate 
time fixed effects by region. 
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regression to find a deterrent effect, even though the same pattern was observed 
in states that experienced no change to their death penalty laws. It turns out that 
controlling for these confounding trends cuts the coefficient on the death 
penalty in half and makes the coefficient clearly statistically insignificant. 
One possible objection to this analysis is that there are many states that are 
de jure death penalty states but de facto nonexecuting, and hence, the binary 
legal classification is inadequate. Thus, in Column 4 we make a distinction 
between those states that actively apply their death penalty statutes and those 
that do not. We define a death penalty statute as inactive if that state had no 
executions over the preceding ten years, an admittedly crude approach. In each 
case, we find no statistically significant effects of the death penalty. Moreover, 
the data suggest that active death penalty statutes are neither more nor less 
(in)effective than inactive death penalty statutes. 
Table 2: Panel Data Estimates of the Effects of Death Penalty Laws on Murder 
Rates: 1960-2000 
Dependent Variable: Annual Homicides Per 100,000 Residentss,t 
 
Dezhbakhsh 
and 
Shepherd 
(1) 
Our 
Replication 
(2) 
Controlling 
for Year 
Fixed 
Effects 
(3) 
De Facto 
Versus 
De Jure 
Laws 
(4) 
Death Penalty Law 
 
-0.87*** 
(.21) 
-0.95 
(.57) 
-0.47 
(.74)  
Active Death Penalty Law 
(≥ 1 Execution in Previous 
Decade) 
 
   
-0.57 
(.63) 
Inactive Death Penalty Law 
(No Executions in Previous 
Decade) 
 
   
-0.45 
(.77) 
 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 .804 .791 .834 .834 
Sample Size 
(Excludes DC, HI) (unknown) 2009 2009
 2009 
Notes: Sources and data are as described in Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra 
note 33, at tbl.7. Population-weighted least squares regression also includes 
controls for state per capita real income, the unemployment rate, police 
employment, proportions of the population nonwhite, aged 15-19, and 
aged 20-24. ***, **, and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd find that a death penalty law is associated with 
less crime, but our replication in Column 2, as well as other plausible 
estimates in Columns 3 and 4, show no significant effect. 
 
The most important finding in Table 2 is simply how difficult it is to isolate 
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any causal effects with confidence. The standard errors in our preferred 
estimates suggest that even if death penalty laws deterred 15% of all homicides 
(or caused 15% more homicides), the data speak so unclearly that they could 
not rule out the possibility of no effect. 
These data also allow us to extend the analysis of the distribution of 
estimates across death penalty experiments. Specifically, we extend our panel 
data approach, but rather than analyzing a single variable describing whether a 
state has a death penalty law, we estimate separate effects for each 
experiment.47 That is, for each of the forty-five death penalty abolitions in the 
sample, we analyze its effects by including a separate dummy variable set equal 
to one for that state subsequent to the law change. We also include forty-one 
further dummy variables for each death penalty adoption in the sample. In all 
other respects, the specification remains the same as in Dezhbakhsh and 
Shepherd, although we continue to control for year fixed effects. Table 3 
reports these results. 
Table 3: Estimating the Individual Effects of Death Penalty Reform on the 
Homicide Rate for 41 Reinstatements and 45 Abolitions: 1960-2000 
Dependent Variable: Annual Homicides per 100,000 Residentss,t 
State Death Penalty Reinstatement Death Penalty Abolition 
 
Year Estimated Effect 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Year Estimated Effect 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Alabama 1976 -3.2 (-4.1, -2.4) 1972 -1.2 (-2.8, 0.5) 
Arizona 1976 1.1 (0.2, 1.9) 1972 -1.5 (-3.2, 0.2) 
Arkansas 1976 -0.5 (-1.4, 0.3) 1972 -2.4 (-4.1, -0.8) 
California 1977 2.3 (1.3, 3.2) 1972 1.1 (-0.8, 2.9) 
Colorado 1976 -0.8 (-1.9, 0.3) 1972 -1.7 (-3.7, 0.2) 
Connecticut 1976 0.6 (-0.8, 2.0) 1972 -2.5 (-4.4, -0.6) 
Delaware 1976 -2.2 (-3.1, -1.4) 1972 -2.7 (-4.6, -0.7) 
 1961 -1.6 (-2.2, -1.0)    
Florida 1976 -3.4 (-4.2, -2.6) 1972 -0.2 (-2.0, 1.5) 
Georgia 1976 -5.1 (-6.0, -4.3) 1972 1.0 (-0.6, 2.7) 
Idaho 1976 0.2 (-0.6, 1.0) 1972 -2.8 (-4.6, -1.0) 
Illinois 1976 0.3 (-0.7, 1.2) 1972 -0.3 (-2.2, 1.6) 
Indiana 1976 0.2 (-0.5, 1.0) 1972 -0.4 (-2.2, 1.4) 
Iowa    1965 -3.2 (-4.7, -1.6) 
Kansas 1994 3.1 (1.8, 4.4) 1972 -2.2 (-4.1, -0.3) 
Kentucky 1976 -1.6 (-2.5, -0.8) 1972 -1.6 (-3.3, 0.0) 
Louisiana 1976 1.4 (0.7, 2.1) 1972 1.5 (-0.2, 3.2) 
Maryland 1976 -0.6 (-1.6, 0.4) 1972 -0.1 (-2.1, 1.9) 
Massachusetts 1982 -0.3 (-1.2, 0.7) 1972 -2.8 (-4.6, -0.9) 
    1984 -0.3 (-1.0, 0.5) 
Mississippi 1976 -1.9 (-2.9, -0.9) 1972 0.6 (-1.1, 2.3) 
 
47. As such, this approach is a natural extension of the analysis in Table 1, with the 
advantage that panel analysis allows for regression-adjusted comparisons and takes account 
of the full time series, rather than an arbitrary comparison window. Note that while Table 1 
included Washington, D.C., missing police data force us to drop it from this analysis. 
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Missouri 1976 0.3 (-0.5, 1.0) 1972 -1.4 (-3.1, 0.4) 
Montana 1976 0.6 (-0.5, 1.8) 1972 -2.6 (-4.5, -0.7) 
Nebraska 1976 0.3 (-0.5, 1.1) 1972 -2.9 (-4.8, -0.9) 
Nevada 1976 -0.8 (-1.8, 0.3) 1972 1.2 (-0.5, 2.9) 
New 
Hampshire 1991 0.1 (-0.7, 1.0) 1972 -3.5 (-5.4, -1.6) 
New Jersey 1982 -1.3 (-2.3, -0.2) 1972 -1.3 (-3.3, 0.7) 
New Mexico 1979 0.3 (-0.5, 1.1) 1969 0.5 (-0.9, 1.8) 
New York 1995 -2.9 (-4.4, -1.5) 1965 2.9 (1.0, 4.7) 
North Carolina 1977 -2.4 (-3.4, -1.5) 1972 -1.3 (-3.0, 0.3) 
North Dakota    1972 -3.8 (-5.6, -2.0) 
Ohio 1976 -1.2 (-1.9, -0.5) 1972 -0.4 (-2.2, 1.3) 
Oklahoma 1976 1.1 (0.3, 1.8) 1972 -1.8 (-3.5, -0.1) 
Oregon 1978 -0.6 (-1.6, 0.4) 1964 -1.8 (-2.8, -0.7) 
Pennsylvania 1976 -0.1 (-0.9, 0.7) 1972 -0.9 (-2.6, 0.8) 
Rhode Island 1977 -1.1 (-2.4, 0.2) 1984 0.6 (0.1, 1.0) 
South Carolina 1976 -4.8 (-5.6, -3.8) 1972 -0.5 (-2.2, 1.2) 
South Dakota 1979 0.5 (-0.1, 1.1) 1972 -4.4 (-6.3, -2.6) 
Tennessee 1976 -2.1 (-2.9, -1.3) 1972 -0.1 (-1.8, 1.7) 
Texas 1976 -0.1 (-1.1, 0.9) 1972 -0.1 (-1.7, 1.6) 
Utah 1976 0.8 (-0.1, 1.6) 1972 -3.1 (-4.8, -1.4) 
Vermont    1965 -2.9 (-4.4, -1.4) 
Virginia 1976 -2.7 (-3.6, -1.7) 1972 -2.0 (-3.8, -0.3) 
Washington 1976 0.7 (-0.5, 1.9) 1972 -1.8 (-3.6, -0.0) 
West Virginia    1965 -2.8 (-4.5, -1.0) 
Wyoming 1977 -0.9 (-1.5, -0.2) 1972 -3.4 (-5.3, -1.4) 
Simple Average -0.70   -1.32  
Precision-Weighted 
Average -0.67   -0.86  
Population-weighted 
Average -0.72   -0.39  
Notes: This table shows the effect on murder rates of forty-one reinstatements 
of death penalty laws and forty-five abolitions of such laws. It is derived from 
the same data and models that were used to estimate aggregated effects of 
such legal changes averaged over all switching states (in Table 2, infra). 
Alaska, Hawaii, Maine Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are not shown 
because they never had the death penalty throughout the sample period (and 
there is some debate over North Dakota). The District of Columbia and 
Hawaii were dropped from the sample because of missing police data. 
Sources, data, and specification follow Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra note 
33, at tbl.7, as described in Table 2, except that we add year fixed effects and 
include forty-one death penalty reinstatements and forty-five death penalty 
abolition dummy variables (set equal to zero before the change and one 
subsequently), rather than a single binary variable covering all eighty-six 
experiments. Controls include per capita real income; the unemployment rate; 
police employment; proportions of the population nonwhite, aged 15-19, and 
aged 20-24; and state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in 
parentheses, clustered at the state level. The precision-weighted average is 
generated by weighting by the inverse of the squared standard error. 
 
For neither death penalty abolitions nor reinstatements do we see a 
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particularly coherent picture. Estimates of the “effect” of death penalty 
abolition on the homicide rate (conditional on the control variables) are positive 
in eight cases and negative in thirty-seven cases. Likewise, reinstatement of the 
death penalty was subsequently associated with a higher homicide rate in 
seventeen states and a lower rate in twenty-four states. On average, the 
homicide rate appears to be lower than otherwise suggested by developments in 
the control variables following either abolition or reinstatement of the death 
penalty. That said, these differences are not statistically significant, and these 
comparisons merely point to the difficulty in discerning any causal effect of 
death penalty laws.  
Figure 4 shows the distribution of before-and-after comparisons across 
states, using the data in Table 3. These distributions highlight the problem of 
getting these data to speak clearly: the variance of individual state homicide 
rates is so great that it is difficult to discern the average effects of these changes 
with any precision, even with eighty-six “experiments” to analyze. Shepherd 
has performed a related reanalysis of three papers that examine the effects of 
executions (rather than the presence of a death penalty law), and she also finds 
that there are about as many states whose experiences are consistent with the 
deterrence hypothesis as with the antideterrence one.48 
It is worth noting that Mocan and Gittings also include an analysis of the 
efficacy of death penalty laws over a sample running from 1977 to 1997, 
although their regressions only include data from 1980 to 1997.49 Despite their 
professed confidence in their results, Mocan and Gittings’s analysis includes 
only six policy change experiments. We have reanalyzed their data following a 
similar design to that above: we follow their data and programs (which they 
graciously shared) but analyze the death penalty “effects” separately for each 
state, making sure to control for the same variables as in their main 
specification. For the four states adopting the death penalty, their specification 
suggests that homicide rates were subsequently higher in Kansas and New 
Hampshire and lower in New Jersey and New York. In their sample, only 
Massachusetts and Rhode Island abolished the death penalty, and in both cases 
homicide rates fell following the law change (relative to the baseline 
established by their regression). These facts make it difficult to conclude with 
any confidence that the death penalty raises or lowers homicide rates.50 
 
48. See Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 46 (reanalyzing data 
from Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra note 33, Dezhbakhsh, Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 
11, and Shepherd, Murders of Passion, supra note 46). Shepherd argues that antideterrence 
is evident in some states because they do not execute sufficient convicts to reach a 
“threshold effect” required for deterrence. 
49. Mocan & Gittings, supra note 11, at 478. 
50. That Mocan and Gittings obtain statistically significant estimates reflects the fact 
that New York and New Jersey were the two states consistent with deterrence, and their 
influence in a population-weighted regression dwarfs that of the four states inconsistent with 
deterrence. Id. 
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Given the demonstrated difficulties in linking the presence of death penalty 
laws with homicide rates, several authors also have tried to exploit variation in 
the intensity with which death penalty laws have been applied. Consequently, 
the variable of interest in these studies does not describe the presence of a death 
penalty law but rather a variable measuring the propensity to invoke the death 
penalty. The intensity with which a state pursues death penalty prosecutions 
may be highly politicized, raising the possibility that such estimates may reflect 
omitted factors related to the political economy of punishment. On the demand 
side, variation in crime rates may change the political pressure for executions. 
Equally on the supply side, it seems plausible that more vigorous deployment 
of the death penalty might occur at the same time that the government elects to 
“get tough on crime” along a range of other dimensions, including sentencing, 
prison conditions, arrests, police harassment, and so on. As these studies move 
beyond the sharp judicial or legislative experiments analyzed above, the issues 
involved in distinguishing correlation from causation may become even more 
salient. 
However as Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich emphasize, beyond the usual 
difficulties in establishing a causal relationship, there is a much simpler 
statistical dilemma: the annual number of executions fluctuates very little while 
the number of homicides varies dramatically. Under these conditions, it is “a 
difficult challenge to extract the execution-related signal from the noise in 
Figure 4. Distribution of Regression-Estimated Effects Across States
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homicide rates.”51 Indeed, following their own empirical investigation for the 
years 1950 to 1990, Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich conclude that “[e]ven if a 
substantial deterrent effect does exist, the amount of crime rate variation 
induced by executions may simply be too small to be detected”52 and that 
“[t]here simply does not appear to be enough information in the data on capital 
punishment to reliably estimate a deterrent effect.”53 
Countering these words of caution, several recent studies claim to have 
compiled robust evidence of the deterrent effect of capital punishment. We 
begin by updating Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich’s study to incorporate data 
revisions and add data from 1991 to 2000, before turning to these alternative 
studies. 
A. Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich 
Katz, Levitt, and Shustorvich generously provided us with their 1950 to 
1990 dataset, so we were easily able to replicate their results. These authors 
regressed state homicide rates on the number of executions per 1000 prisoners 
(with a rich set of controls), concluding that “the execution rate coefficient is 
extremely sensitive to the choice of specification . . . .”54 Panel A of Table 4 
shows our replication of their original estimates over the 1950 to 1990 sample 
using revised data; these estimates are very close to those reported in their 
paper.55 Panel B reports results over our updated 1950 to 2000 sample, while 
Panel C analyzes the largest possible sample, extending back as far as 1934 and 
forward through to 2000. 
Reading across each row, estimates of the effects of executions on the 
homicide rate appear quite inconsistent across specifications, with point 
estimates ranging from positive to negative in Panels A and B. Reading down 
each column, we see that this inconsistency holds across time periods as well; 
while several specifications are consistent with deterrence for the 1950 to 1990 
sample, these results largely disappear if the models are estimated over the 
slightly longer period from 1950 to 2000 (Panel B). Indeed, Panel C reveals 
that when the models are estimated over the longest period (1934 to 2000), the 
signs reverse, and executions are associated with higher rates of murder. In 
sum, the alternative samples continue to point to the difficulty in pinning down 
robust estimates of the deterrent effect of the death penalty suggested by Katz, 
Levitt, and Shustorovich. 
 
51. Katz, Levitt & Shustorovich, supra note 10, at 319. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 321-22. 
54. Id. at 330. 
55. Note that we report standard errors clustered at the state level, although this makes 
little practical difference because Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich reported standard errors 
clustered at the state-decade level. 
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Table 4: Estimating the Effect of Executions on Murder Rates Using the Katz, 
Levitt, and Shustorovich Model for Three Time Periods: 1934-2000 
Dependent Variable: Homicides per 100,000 Residentss,t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Panel A: Replication for 1950-1990 Sample 
Executionss,t 
per 1000 
Prisonerss,t 
0.32 
(.38) 
-0.67** 
(.33) 
-0.31 
(.31) 
-0.56** 
(.30) 
0.01 
(.20) 
-0.07 
(.14) 
-0.08 
(.14) 
-0.22* 
(.14) 
 Panel B: Augmented Sample—1950-2000 
Executionss,t 
per 1000 
Prisonerss,t 
0.48 
(.45) 
-0.58 
(.38) 
-0.20 
(.37) 
-0.39 
(.40) 
-0.14 
(.22) 
-0.29 
(.20) 
-0.07 
(.14) 
-0.23 
(.14) 
 Panel C: Maximum Sample—1934-2000 
Executionss,t 
per 1000 
Prisonerss,t 
1.54*** 
(.34) 
0.19 
(.27) 
0.48 
(.30) 
0.20 
(.26) 
0.67*** 
(.24) 
0.31 
(.19) 
0.06 
(.12) 
-0.02 
(.12) 
 
Implied Life-Life Tradeoff(a) 
[95% Confidence Interval] 
Panel A: 
1950-1990 
-1.8 
[-3.6,-0.1] 
0.6 
[-0.9,2.2] 
-0.2 
[-1.7,1.3] 
0.4 
[-1.1,1.8] 
-1.0 
[-2.0,-0.1] 
-0.8 
[-1.5,-0.1] 
-0.8 
[-1.5,-0.2] 
-0.5 
[-1.1,0.2] 
Panel B: 
1950-2000 
-2.2 
[-4.3,0.0] 
0.4 
[-1.4,2.2] 
-0.5 
[-2.3,1.2] 
-0.1 
[-2.0,1.9] 
-0.7 
[-1.7,0.4] 
-0.3 
[-1.2,0.7] 
-0.8 
[-1.5,-0.2] 
-0.4 
[-1.1,0.2] 
Panel C: 
1934-2000 
-4.7 
[-6.4,-3.1] 
-1.5 
[-2.7,-0.2] 
-2.2 
[-3.6,-0.7] 
-1.5 
[-2.7,-0.2] 
-2.6 
[-3.8,-1.5] 
-1.7 
[-2.6,-0.9] 
-1.1 
[-1.7,-0.6] 
-1.0 
[-1.5,-0.4] 
 Further Controls  
Crime, 
Economic & 
Demographic 
Controls 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region*Year 
Effects No No Yes Yes No No No No 
State Time 
Trends No No No No Yes Yes No No 
State*Decade 
Effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Notes: Panel A shows the Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich estimates of the 
impact of executions on murder rates (using revised data). Panels B and C 
show how those estimates change using longer time periods, with all estimated 
effects showing increased execution rates correlated with increased murder 
rates for the full sample. The bottom half of the table shows the corresponding 
life-life tradeoff numbers, where negative numbers mean that net lives are lost 
for each execution. Note that in order to obtain the long samples in Panel C, 
we drop the infant mortality and unemployment rates as controls; this longer 
sample also introduces a few more missing data cells. 
 The eight specifications and data sources are as in Katz, Levitt & 
Shustorovich, supra note 10, at 327 tbl.2. Crime controls include prisoner 
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death rate, prisoners per crime, and prisoners per capita. Economic controls 
include the real per capita income, insured unemployment rate, and the infant 
mortality rate. The latter two are not included in Panel C. Demographic 
controls are the proportion of the population: black, urban, aged 0-24, and 
aged 25-44. Sample sizes are 1908, 2414, and 2954 for state-year observations 
in Panels A, B, and C, respectively, and all panels omit 1971 due to missing 
data on prison deaths. Population-weighted least squares regression is used, 
and standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 (a) Implied life-life tradeoff reflects net lives saved when evaluated for a 
state with the characteristics of the average death penalty state in 1996. 
 
In order to remain consistent with the debate about what Sunstein and 
Vermeule refer to as the “life-life tradeoff,”56 we also compute the implied 
number of lives saved per execution. In order to fix a particular set of 
parameters (and to maintain continuity with the numbers reported by 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd), we report the implied net number of lives 
saved by an execution for a state with the characteristics of the average death 
penalty state in 1996 (holding all other factors constant).57 Given that Table 4 
involves the largest sample of data in our analysis, it is not surprising that the 
95% confidence intervals surrounding these estimates, while wide, imply these 
estimates are notably more precise than we obtain with other specifications in 
Tables 5 through 9. 
B. Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd 
The Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd study covers data from 1960 to 2000, and 
their analysis of the effects of executions largely shadows their analysis of the 
effects of death penalty laws.58 That is, they run the same regression as 
described in Table 2, but replace the death penalty binary variable with a 
variable intended to capture the propensity to invoke the death penalty. The 
first column of Table 5 shows their reported results, while the next column 
shows the same regression, controlling for year fixed effects. As before, we 
 
56. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 708 (introducing the concept of a 
“life-life tradeoff” in the capital punishment debate). 
57. To compute this, note that executing one more death row inmate raises the 
execution rate from X/P to (X+1)/P, where X is the number of executions, and P is the 
denominator of the execution rate, which in this instance is the number of prisoners. The 
effect of the execution rate on the homicide rate is mediated by the estimated coefficient, β, 
yielding a decline in the homicide rate of –β/P. To determine the number of lives saved, we 
need to multiply the decline in the homicide rate (homicides per 100,000 people) by the 
population/100,000, and subtract one to take account of the executed convict. Thus a tradeoff 
of zero implies that each execution kills one convict and saves one homicide victim; a 
positive number implies that more than one homicide victim is saved, and a negative number 
suggests that each execution results in a greater number of total deaths. 
58. Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra note 33. 
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continue to report standard errors clustered at the state level. Superficially, 
these results suggest extremely significant evidence in favor of deterrence. 
Table 5: Estimating the Impact of Executions on Murder Rates, Testing the 
Sensitivity of Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd’s Results: 1960-2000 
Dependent Variable: Annual Homicides per 100,000 Residentss,t 
 Published 
Adding 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Omitting 
Texas 
Alternative Definitions of 
Execution Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Executionss,t -0.145*** 
(.013) 
-0.138*** 
(.013) 
-0.137* 
(.070)    
Executionss,t per 
100,000 Residentss,t 
   
-8.36 
(5.84)   
Executionss,t per 1000 
Prisonerss,t 
    
-0.38 
(0.47)  
Executionss,t per 
Homicide
 s,t-1 
     
-50.7 
(31.7) 
N (unknown) 2009 1968 2009 2009 2009 
 Implied Life-Life Tradeoff(a) 
[95% Confidence Interval] 
Net Lives Saved per 
Execution 
7.8 
[6.1, 9.4] 
7.3 
[5.8., 8.9] 
7.3 
[-1.0, 15.5] 
7.4 
[-4.1,18.8] 
-0.1 
[-2.4, 2.2] 
5.0 
[-2.3, 12.3] 
 Further Controls  
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decade Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Column 1 shows the results for the estimated impact of executions on 
murder rates reported in Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra note 33, tbl.7 (and 
the basic specification and data sources are as described therein). Controls 
include per capita real income, the unemployment rate, police employment, 
proportions of the population nonwhite, aged 15-19, and aged 20-24. Column 
2 begins by adding in year fixed effects, and Column 3 shows the estimated 
effects of executions on murder rates become much less precisely estimated 
when Texas is omitted. Columns 4-6 also show that the estimated effect of 
executions becomes insignificant when various measures of the execution rate 
are analyzed, instead of the raw number of executions. The bottom portion of 
Table 5 shows the corresponding life-life tradeoff numbers, where negative 
numbers mean that, on net, lives are lost for each execution. 
 Population-weighted least squares regression is used. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 (a) Implied life-life tradeoff reflects net lives saved evaluated for a state 
with the characteristics of the average death penalty state in 1996. 
 
However, as Richard Berk has noted, the distribution of executions across 
states is extraordinarily skewed.59 Through 2004, Texas has executed 336 
 
59. Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All 
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convicts since the Gregg decision. The next closest state is Virginia at 94 
executions, while only ten other states have recorded more than twenty 
executions and seventeen states have recorded no executions.60 As a result, it 
seems useful to test the sensitivity of the baseline equation to the omission of 
Texas. While the effect on the coefficient reported in Column 3 of Table 5 is 
rather small, the effect on the estimated standard error is dramatic, and the 
estimated impact of executions becomes statistically insignificant. Similarly, 
Shepherd has shown that the evidence for deterrence in these data rests 
critically on variation arising from a few states, and the vast majority of states 
experienced either no deterrence or antideterrence.61 The implication of our 
Table 5, however, is not that Texas is an outlier (indeed, given the constancy of 
the coefficient, it probably lies along the regression line), but rather that in its 
absence, there is just too little variation in executions to discern an effect with 
any confidence. 
A more direct difficulty with Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd’s specification is 
that the independent variable is simply the number of executions in that state 
each year. Not only does this exaggerate the problem of Texas (the large 
number of executions partly reflects the fact that there are more people and 
more murders in Texas than in many other states), but it also is a somewhat 
bizarre choice. For example, this specification implies that one more execution 
in Wyoming would deter three-fourths of a homicide, while in California it 
would deter fifty homicides. 
A very simple alternative that avoids this scaling issue is measuring 
executions per 100,000 residents. These results are reported in Column 4, and 
this regression suggests that the relationship between homicides and executions 
per capita is statistically insignificant. 
An alternative scaling comes from Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich, who 
define their executions variable as executions per 1000 prisoners.62 This 
regression, shown in Column 5, again fails to find a significant relationship 
between homicide and execution rates, with the point estimate suggesting that 
each execution deters 0.9 homicides for a net loss of 0.1 life. Another 
alternative scaling—and perhaps the one most directly suggested by the 
economic model of crime—is to analyze the ratio of the number of executions 
to the (lagged) homicide rate.63 Once again, this regression, shown in 
 
over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 305 (2005). 
60. BONCZAR & SNELL, supra note 8, at 9 tbl.9. 
61. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 46. 
62. This alternative scaling yields a slightly smaller sample because data on the 
number of prisoners in Alaska are not available until 1972. For other missing values of the 
prisoner variable, we simply use linear interpolation. 
63. We use the lagged homicide rate so that the number of homicides does not appear 
in the construction of both the independent and dependent variables. Specifically, if there 
were measurement errors in the number of homicides, this would cause the dependent 
variable to increase (decrease) and the independent variable to decrease (increase), creating 
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Column 6, fails to find any significant relationship. 
C. Mocan and Gittings 
Mocan and Gittings examine state homicide rates over the 1984 to 1997 
(post-moratorium) period,64 running the following regression: 
s ,t s ,t 1 s ,t 1 s,t-1
1 2 3
s ,t s ,t 7 s ,t 7 s ,t 6
s ,t 1 s ,t 1
4 5
s ,t 3
Murders Executions Pardons  Removals
( Population / 100,000 ) DeathSentences DeathSentences DeathSentences
DeathSentences HomicideArrests
Arrests Mur
β β β
β β
− −
− − −
− −
−
= + +
+ + s ,t s t t s ,t
s ts ,t 1
Controls State * Trend Time
ders
γ ε
−
+ + + +∑ ∑
 
The authors provided us with their data, and Panel A of Table 6 shows that 
we were able to replicate their results. In the process of doing so, we found a 
number of coding errors, and a set of corrected estimates is given in Panel B.65 
These estimates are reasonably similar to those found in Panel A, although in 
no case are any of the estimates of the effects of executions statistically 
significant. Equally, the effects of death row removals appear somewhat 
stronger in these numbers. 
One feature that is immediately obvious from inspecting their model is that 
it has a rather complex temporal structure: the variables of interest are 
constructed as ratios to the number of death sentences imposed six or seven 
years earlier or the number of arrests three years earlier. While the authors 
choose this functional form to maintain continuity with Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, 
and Shepherd, this rather contrived structure comes at a significant price. Their 
data only runs from 1977 to 1997, and hence this lag specification costs them 
one-third of their sample since their deterrence variables are only defined over 
the 1984 to 1997 period. Moreover, given that the authors are attempting to 
represent the probability of execution as perceived by potential murderers, and 
given the paucity of evidence on how these expectations are formed, there 
seems little reason to strongly prefer one specification over the other. Thus, in 
Panel C, we rerun their regressions but note Zimmerman’s argument that “any 
truly meaningful (subjective) assessment a potential murderer makes . . . is 
likely to be based upon the most recent information available to him/her.”66  
 
an artificial negative correlation between execution and homicide rates. 
64. Mocan & Gittings, supra note 11, at 478. While their data runs from 1977 to 1997, 
their complicated lag structure means that they can only estimate effects from 1984 onward.  
65. Two types of coding errors were discovered. First, the authors attempted to drop all 
observations where the explanatory variable was the ratio of a positive value to zero but 
ended up both dropping the prior observation and including the variable they intended to 
drop, coded as the ratio of the numerator to 0.99. Second, in Models 3, 5, and 6, the 
execution rate was defined relative to the number of death sentences six years prior instead 
of seven years prior, as they did in their other specifications (and described in their text). 
66. Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 170.  
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Table 6: Estimating the Impact of Executions on Murder Rates: Reanalyzing 
Mocan and Gittings: 1977-1997 
 Dependent Variable: 
 
Annual Homicides per 100,000 Residentss,t Log Homicide Rates,t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Panel A: Mocan and Gittings Results: Replication 
Executionst-1 per 
Death Sentencet-7 
-0.60* 
(.35)   
-0.63* 
(0.34) 
-0.63** 
(.29) 
-0.05* 
(.03) 
-0.05* 
(.03) 
Pardonst-1 per 
Death Sentencet-7 
 
0.69** 
(.32)  
0.73** 
(.30)  
0.11*** 
(.03)  
Death Row 
Removalst-1 per 
Death Sentencet-6 
  
0.17** 
(.07)  
0.18** 
(.07)  
0.02** 
(0.01) 
Sample 
 (1984-1997) 680 693 695 679 690 679 690 
 Panel B: Correcting Programming Errors 
Executionst-1 per 
Death Sentencet-7 
-0.50 
(.34)   
-0.52 
(.33) 
-0.59 
(0.39) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Pardonst-1 per 
Death Sentencet-7 
 
0.63* 
(.34)  
0.71** 
(.30)  
0.09*** 
(0.03)  
Death Row 
Removalst-1 per 
Death Sentencet-6 
  
0.24*** 
(.08)  
0.17* 
(0.09)  
0.01 
(0.01) 
Sample  
(1984-1997) 679 692 691 677 636 677 636 
 
Panel C: Measuring Deterrence Variables with a One-Year Lag on 
Full Sample 
Executionst-1 per 
Death Sentencet-1 
0.03 
(0.14)   
0.01 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Pardonst-1 per 
Death Sentencet-1 
 
0.41*** 
(.13)  
0.41*** 
(0.13)  
0.05*** 
(0.01)  
Death Row 
Removalst-1 per 
Death Sentencet-1 
  
0.02 
(0.03)  
0.02 
(0.03)  
0.002 
(.002) 
Sample 
(1978-1997) 986 984 921 977 918 977 918 
 
Implied Life-Life Tradeoff for Executions(a) 
[95% Confidence Interval] 
Panel A: 
Replication 
4.4 
[-1.8, 10.5]   
4.6 
[-1.4, 10.6] 
4.6 
[-0.5, 9.7] 
2.2 
[-1.2, 5.7] 
2.3 
[-1.3, 6.0] 
Panel B: 
Corrected 
3.4 
[-2.6, 9.4]   
3.6 
[-2.2, 9.5] 
4.2 
[-2.6,11.1] 
-0.2 
[-3.7, 3.4] 
0.5 
[-2.7, 3.7] 
Panel C: Full 
Sample 
-1.2 
[-3.1, 0.7]   
-1.1 
[-2.8, 0.7] 
-1.1 
[-3.0, 0.8] 
-1.6 
[-2.7, -0.5] 
-1.6 
[-2.8, -0.4] 
Notes: Panel A shows the estimated effect of executions on the homicide rate, 
where the specification and data are from Mocan & Gittings, supra note 11, at 
464 tbl.2. Panel B corrects some programming errors, and the resulting 
estimated effects of execution on murder rates are no longer significant. 
Panel C alters the measure of the deterrence variables and uses the full sample 
period from 1978 to 1997, which leads to a positive correlation between 
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execution and homicide rates. The bottom portion of the table shows the 
corresponding life-life tradeoff numbers, where negative numbers mean that, 
on net, lives are lost for each execution.  
 Controls include lags of the homicide arrest rate, death sentence rate 
(conditional on arrest), prisoners per violent crime, prison death rate, as well 
as contemporary values of real per capita income, the unemployment rate, 
infant mortality rate, shares of the population who are: urban, black, aged 20-
34, 35-44, 45-54, 55+, and dummy variables for whether a state has a 
Republican governor, whether the state drinking age is 18, 19, or 20, and the 
1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Population-weighted least squares regression 
is used with standard errors clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 (a) Implied life-life tradeoff reflects net lives saved evaluated for a state 
with the characteristics of the average death penalty state in 1996. 
 
In Panel C, we construct each of the deterrence variables as ratios of 
variables lagged one year (instead of seven).67 This relatively small change 
yields positive, albeit insignificant, coefficients. The difficulty in obtaining any 
consistent results is once again evident. Not only do the estimates of the effects 
of the execution rate vary significantly with only minor changes in 
specification, but the two related measures of the porosity of the death sentence 
now yield sharply different results, with the pardon rate robustly and positively 
associated with homicide, but the coefficient on the broader death row removal 
rate small and insignificant. 
D. Other Studies 
At least four other studies are worthy of brief discussion. First, 
Zimmerman analyzes a state panel of homicide rates over the period from 1978 
to 1997, and his OLS regressions suggest no relationship between homicide 
rates and the execution rate. (We comment on his instrumental variables results 
in the next Part.) This is consistent with our reanalysis of Mocan and Gittings’s 
data over the same time period. 
Second, Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd analyze a quite impressive 
county-level dataset covering the period from 1977 to 1996. While their paper 
only reports instrumental variables results (more on these below), the authors 
have generously shared their data with us, and we have computed simple panel 
OLS results, borrowing all other aspects of their specification. Again, we find 
wildly inconsistent results across specifications, ranging from statistically 
 
67. The immediate advantage of using the one-year lag is that the sample size 
increases by fifty percent from what Mocan and Gittings present. We remain unsure whether 
Mocan and Gittings or Zimmerman (or neither) is correct on the appropriate lag structure 
because there is little evidence on how criminals form their expectations. Even so, if a small 
change among reasonable choices makes a large difference in the estimation, then the results 
are too fragile to warrant reliance.  
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significant antideterrent effects to statistically significant deterrent effects. 
Disaggregating to the county level does not alleviate the problems we have 
seen with state-level analyses. This should not be surprising because the study’s 
key explanatory variable, the execution rate, is still measured at the state 
level.68 
Third, Dale Cloninger and Roberto Marchesini have analyzed data on the 
recent Illinois moratorium experiment.69 Governor Ryan issued a moratorium 
on executions in January 2000 and subsequently commuted all death sentences 
in January 2003. It seems useful to compare the evolution of homicides in 
Illinois subsequent to January 2000 with the same evolution in the rest of the 
country. The methods employed by Cloninger and Marchesini reflect the 
authors’ backgrounds as financial economists: they apply an event study 
methodology, examining the usual co-movement of the number of homicides in 
Illinois with the number of homicides nationally and then asking whether this 
relationship changed following the Illinois moratorium. 
The main difficulty with their analysis is that they follow finance methods 
a little too closely. In finance, the variable of interest is usually a stock return, 
so it is standard practice to take a stock index and analyze its percentage change 
over some period. As such, Cloninger and Marchesini analyze the relationship 
between twelve-month-ended growth in the homicide rate in Illinois and their 
comparison sample. However, the debate over the efficacy of capital 
punishment is usually posed as asking whether it leads to lower levels of 
homicide, rather than a differential growth rate.70 Moreover, differential growth 
rates—if interpreted literally—would lead to predictions that homicide rates 
may head to 0% or 100%.  
Cloninger and Marchesini generously shared their monthly data (covering 
January 1994 to December 2003) with us, and Figure 5 shows the seasonally 
adjusted number of homicides in Illinois and in the rest of the United States 
through this time period. The close relationship between the two again supports 
the contention that levels of homicide provide a useful baseline against which 
to compare the subsequent experience in Illinois. Figure 5 also shows a dashed 
line: the projected number of homicides in Illinois if the relationship between 
 
68. There are potentially further issues arising from the unreliability of county-level 
data. See Michael D. Maltz & Joseph Targonski, A Note on the Use of County-Level UCR 
Data, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 297, 298 (2002); see also Ian Ayres & John J. 
Donohue, III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1193 (2003). 
69. Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution Moratoriums, Commutations 
and Deterrence: The Case of Illinois (Econ. Working Paper Archive, Working Paper No. 
0507002, 2005), available at http://econwpa.wustl.edu:80/eps/le/papers/0507/0507002.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2005). 
70. The homicide rate is probably preferable to the homicide count, although we 
analyze the latter here to maintain continuity with Cloninger and Marchesini, noting that 
population growth is unlikely to have driven much of a gap between movements in homicide 
rates and levels over such a short time horizon. 
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the series for Illinois and the United States over the period from 1994 to 1999 
had continued over the next four years. In an event study, one compares the 
subsequent evolution of the variable of interest with this projection, and the 
bars show the gap between Illinois homicides and the projected number of 
homicides. 
It should be clear from inspecting the graph that the relationship between 
homicides in Illinois and the rest of the country is roughly unchanged since the 
moratorium. If anything, the bars appear persistently negative, suggesting that 
Illinois experienced about three fewer homicides per month than one would 
have expected based upon its previous relationship with the rest of the 
country.71 
Finally, Cloninger and Marchesini72 applied similar methods to analyze 
another quasi-experiment: a period from 1996 to early 1997 in which 
executions ground to a halt until the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled on 
 
71. The post-moratorium decline in homicides is actually statistically significant, 
although given how sparse this specification is, we do not want to overstate this point. Over 
the full sample, we estimated: 
ln(Illinois homicides)t = -1.04 + 0.74*ln(US-IL homicides)t –  0.06 Post 2000t 
  (0.90) (0.13) (0.03) 
where we report Newey-West standard errors to account for up to sixth-order autocorrelation. 
Using this full-sample estimate, murders were six percent lower during the moratorium. 
72. Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi-
Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED ECON. 569 (2001). 
Figure 5. Homicides Before and After the Illinois Moratorium
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the legality of new legislation limiting state habeas corpus petitions.73 Figure 6 
shows our reanalysis of these data, focusing again on the number of homicides 
(rather than their rate of change), and once again we find no evidence of an 
abnormal rise (or fall) in Texas homicides during this period. 
V. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATES 
The studies that we have examined so far simply highlight the correlation 
between execution and homicide rates while controlling for other factors. 
Although their authors typically have premised their analyses on the 
assumption that changes in execution policy cause changes in crime rates, there 
are other possibilities that might explain this correlation. 
First, a “get tough on crime” attitude might lead to longer jail sentences,74 
increased use of life without parole,75 harsher prison conditions,76 as well as 
increased use of the death penalty. It might be that criminals are responding to 
these other changes in deterrence, and given that the existing estimates contain 
no (or inadequate) controls for these factors, they may be driving the 
correlation between homicides and executions. There are good reasons to be 
 
73. Ex parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see also Kate Thomas, 
Texas Executions Take a Sabbatical, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 26, 1996, at A8. 
74. Passell & Taylor, supra note 29. 
75. Fagan Statement, supra note 24. 
76. Katz, Levitt & Shustorovich, supra note 10. 
Figure 6. Homicides Before and After the Texas Stay
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concerned by this possibility, as very few criminals are potentially affected by 
the death penalty, while many inmates are likely to be affected by these broader 
changes in deterrence policies. 
Second, public support for the death penalty may be a function of current 
crime rates, and as such, causation may run from homicides to executions. This 
could go in either direction: a high homicide rate might make the public 
frustrated enough to increase use of the death penalty; alternatively if a higher 
homicide rate leads to more executions (for a fixed execution rate), this might 
undermine support for the death penalty. 
Finally, and more generally, there may be a large number of unobservable 
factors changing through time that are correlated with death penalty usage and 
that also affect homicide. In the absence of a comprehensive set of control 
variables, these unobserveable factors might be driving a spurious correlation 
between executions and the death penalty. 
The only way to resolve clearly the issue of causation would be to run an 
experiment in which we would implement the death penalty more (or less) 
vigorously in some states and in some years than in others, and then compare 
the outcomes. Of course experimenting with capital punishment laws in this 
manner does not seem particularly feasible, but one might imagine quasi-
experiments: perhaps there are some factors that might change death penalty 
policy but do not otherwise affect homicide rates. These factors are called 
“instrumental variables” and can be used to analyze the effects of such quasi-
experiments. Naturally, the credibility of such an exercise depends critically on 
whether the instrumental variables really do generate useful experiments that 
change the death penalty rates but do not affect other factors. 
Given the promise that the instrumental variables approach holds for 
resolving questions of causality, it is not surprising that Sunstein and Vermeule 
seem to repose the greatest confidence in a recent application of this method by 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd. 
To briefly review that study, Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd analyze 
county data from 1977 to 1996, using data provided by John Lott and David 
Mustard.77 Following Ehrlich, their paper posits that homicide rates are a 
function of three primary deterrence variables: homicide arrest rates, the 
probability of a death sentence conditional on arrest, and the probability of 
execution conditional on a death sentence. Lott and Mustard’s data allow the 
authors to account for a range of other factors, so they also add controls for the 
assault rate; the robbery rate; real per capita personal income; real per capita 
unemployment insurance payments; real per capita income maintenance 
payments; population density; the proportion of the population aged 10-19, 20-
29; black, white, or other; male or female; and NRA membership. While they 
have county-level data for their dependent variable (the homicide rate), the 
 
77. See Dezhbakhsh, Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 11. 
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homicide arrest rate, and the control variables, they only have state-level data 
on the variables of interest (the “deterrence” explanatory variables). Thus, to be 
somewhat more specific, their main regression is:78 
where c denotes a county, s denotes the state that the county is in, and t denotes 
a year. The main coefficients of interest in this equation are the βs, and 
specifically, they interpret β3 as representing the effects of executions on the 
homicide rate. 
Following Ehrlich’s discussion of the difficulty of making causal 
inferences in this setting,79 the authors are sensitive to concerns that their 
deterrence measures might be driven by other factors, which leads them to run 
instrumental variables regressions. Essentially, this requires them to look for 
changes in deterrence caused by factors unrelated to either prevailing homicide 
rates or the unobserved determinants of crime (like sentence length). They 
believe that they have identified several such variables: state-level police 
payroll, judicial expenditures, Republican vote shares in presidential elections, 
and prison admissions. (Somewhat surprisingly the police, judicial, and prison 
variables are statewide aggregates, rather than per capita numbers, and the 
authors choose not to adjust either police payrolls or judicial expenditures to 
account for inflation.) As such, these variables (plus controls) are included in 
first-stage regressions for each of the deterrence variables. That is, they only 
analyze movements in the deterrence variables that are correlated with state 
police payrolls, judicial expenditures, vote shares, or prison admissions. 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd generously shared their data and code, 
and Joanna Shepherd assisted our efforts, enabling us to perfectly replicate all 
of their results, as shown below in Panel A of Table 7. (Their six main 
regressions, summarized in their Tables 3 and 4, differ slightly in how they 
proxy for the expectations of criminals regarding the deterrence variables.80) 
These results report the regression coefficients on the probability of homicide 
arrest, the probability of a death sentence conditional on arrest, and the 
probability of execution conditional on a death sentence. For continuity, we 
report the same standard errors (and as closely as possible the same 
specification) that the authors do, but will return to this issue below. 
 
78. The authors actually report six main regressions, where each differs slightly in how 
it measures the deterrence variables and how it deals with observations in which a state had 
no murders or issued no death sentence. Id. This equation shows their preferred 
specification, Model 4. 
79. See Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 414.  
80. See Dezhbakhsh, Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 362-63 tbls.3 & 4. 
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Table 7: Estimating Effect of Executions on Murder Rates and Net Lives 
Saved: Testing the Sensitivity of the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (DRS) 
Estimates, 1977-1996 
Dependent Variable: Annual Homicides per 100,000 Residentsc,t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Panel A: Replication of DRS, Estimated Coefficients 
Probability of 
Arrest 
-4.04*** 
(0.58) 
-10.10*** 
(0.57) 
-3.33*** 
(0.52) 
-2.27*** 
(0.50) 
-4.42*** 
(0.45) 
-2.18*** 
(0.48) 
Probability of 
Death Sentence 
Given Arrest 
-21.80 
(18.6) 
-42.41*** 
(13.71) 
-32.12** 
(16.22) 
-3.62 
(14.53) 
-47.66*** 
(10.45) 
-10.76 
(13.13) 
Probability of 
Execution  
Given Death 
Sentence 
-5.17*** 
(0.81) 
-2.89*** 
(0.46) 
-7.40*** 
(0.72) 
-2.71*** 
(0.62) 
-5.20*** 
(0.27) 
-4.78*** 
(0.56) 
 Panel B: Replication of DRS, Implied Life-Life Tradeoff(a) 
Net Lives Saved 36.1
***
 
(5.8) 
19.7*** 
(3.3) 
52.0*** 
(5.1) 
18.5*** 
(4.4) 
36.3*** 
(1.9) 
33.3*** 
(4.0) 
 Panel C: Allowing Only One Partisanship Variable 
Net Lives Saved -24.5
***
 
(8.0) 
-53.8*** 
(6.0) 
-43.3*** 
(8.2) 
-17.7*** 
(6.0) 
-0.9 
(3.0) 
-26.1*** 
(6.2) 
 Panel D: Dropping Texas 
Net Lives Saved -21.5
***
 
(7.6) 
33.7*** 
(4.4) 
6.5 
(7.9) 
-41.6*** 
(5.6) 
32.5*** 
(2.1) 
-11.3* 
(5.9) 
 Panel E: Dropping California 
Net Lives Saved -26.1
***
 
(7.0) 
30.1*** 
(3.9) 
33.3*** 
(6.5) 
-28.7*** 
(4.9) 
17.8*** 
(2.0) 
9.6*** 
(4.8) 
Notes: Panel A replicates the estimates of the impact of deterrence variables 
on murder rates, using the specification and county-level data from 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 362-63 tbls.3-4. Panel B 
converts these estimates into net lives saved per execution, showing a net 
savings of from eighteen to fifty-two lives per execution. Panel C runs the 
regression as described by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd, collapsing the 
partisanship variables into a single instrumental variable indicating the 
percentage of the Republican vote in the last presidential election (instead of 
six variables—one for each election); this specification then predicts that each 
execution will cost between one and fifty-four lives. Panels D and E show 
highly variable estimates when Texas and California are dropped.  
 Population-weighted instrumental variables regressions are used. 
Endogenous independent variables are shown in panel A. Instruments include 
state-level police payroll, judicial expenditures, Republican vote shares, and 
prison admissions. Controls include the assault rate; the robbery rate; real per 
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capita personal income; real per capita unemployment insurance payments; 
real per capita income maintenance payments; population density; the 
proportion of the population aged 10-19, 20-29; black, white, or other; male or 
female; state NRA membership; and county and year fixed effects. Standard 
errors are in parentheses, and ***, **, and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 (a) Implied life-life tradeoff reflects net lives saved evaluated for a state 
with the characteristics of the average death penalty state in 1996. 
 
Given the prominence attached to the implied “life-life” tradeoffs, Panel B 
reports these estimates in terms of the net number of lives saved per execution 
(evaluated for the average executing state in 1996). Thus, Model 4 shows the 
basis of the estimate that eighteen lives are saved (on net) by each execution, as 
trumpeted by Sunstein and Vermeule.81 Because the estimated coefficients 
appearing in Panel A are less easily interpreted, we will convert estimates into 
this “lives saved” metric and report them as such throughout.82 The evidence 
collected in Panels A and B superficially appears to show robust and consistent 
support of the view that execution deters homicide. 
Panels C through E show the sensitivity of Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and 
Shepherd’s results to a number of very simple specification checks, and the 
fragility of their conclusions becomes immediately evident. Panel C shows our 
initial attempt to replicate their results; this regression is actually the one 
described in the text of their paper, but not implemented in their code. One of 
their instrumental variables—that measuring partisan influence in the state—
turned out to be particularly troubling. Specifically, they note that their set of 
instruments includes “partisan influence as measured by the Republican 
presidential candidate’s percentage of the statewide vote in the most recent 
election. . . .”83 The set of results in Panel C implements their model using 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd’s instruments but including—as the text 
cited above suggests—a single variable that denotes the Republican vote share 
in that state in the most recent presidential election. This single change 
generates considerably different results from those reported in their paper, 
suggesting instead a large antideterrent effect. The signs are different, and the 
magnitudes are larger. Note that for Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd’s 
preferred Model 4, this single change flips the sign of their original estimates: 
 
81. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 706. 
82. We should note that this is the relevant tradeoff where the thought experiment 
involves a governor asking about the implications of whether to execute a prisoner on death 
row. For consideration of the Sunstein and Vermeule argument, the relevant margin is 
deciding whether to introduce and enforce the death penalty. Computing the life-life tradeoff 
for this thought experiment requires consideration of a second effect, mediated by changes in 
the probability of obtaining a death sentence. We follow Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd 
in reporting the results of the former, but we note that the qualitative conclusions one would 
draw from our analysis are largely unchanged when considering the latter. 
83. Dezhbakhsh, Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 357. 
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instead of saving eighteen lives, each execution leads to eighteen lives lost. 
The ultimate resolution of this substantial discrepancy lay in the fact that 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd had controlled for “partisan influence” not 
with a single measure of the Republican vote in the most recent election, but by 
defining six different political variables reflecting the Republican vote shares in 
six different presidential elections.84 To be clear, the diametrically opposed 
conclusions of Panels B and C reflect the fact that the regression in Panel C 
implicitly imposes a constant effect of the partisanship variable through time 
(resulting in a finding that the death penalty leads to a large increase in 
murders), while Panel B allows it to change (and even change signs) across 
election cycles (leading to a finding that the death penalty deters murders). Our 
point is not that one specification is preferable to the other. Indeed, sorting that 
out would be a difficult task. Rather, the point is to show the incredible 
sensitivity of Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd’s results to how they code 
their instruments: using the methods described in the paper leads to very 
different results from those using the minor variation that they actually 
implemented. 
Panels D and E show the sensitivity of these results to sample selection. 
We return to Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd’s preferred specification, but in 
Panel D we drop Texas from the data; this change also leads to a wide range of 
estimated effects, with the estimated life-life tradeoff across the six 
specifications ranging from -42 to +34. In Panel E we drop California and this 
also dramatically affects the estimates, with estimates ranging from -29 to +30. 
Of course, both California and Texas are very interesting states, and we do not 
mean to suggest that they don’t contain (substantial) useful information for 
establishing the deterrent effects of the death penalty. Rather, we mean to 
simply highlight the sensitivity of the results. Shepherd has also shown that the 
estimated deterrent or antideterrent effects in this regression vary dramatically 
across states, a fact that she interprets as reflecting some states not executing 
enough convicts to reach a threshold where deterrence applies.85 What is not 
shown in Shepherd’s article is that the same exercise also suggests large effects 
even in states that do not have capital punishment. Thus, an equally likely 
interpretation is that the differences across states also reflect different degrees 
 
84. In other words, we had initially thought that for each year and each state, 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd were using a single continuous variable equal to the 
percentage of the Republican vote in the closest presidential election to that particular year. 
Instead, they had six different continuous variables so that the effect of voting Republican 
would be different for each of the six presidential elections between 1976 and 1996. This 
was accomplished by having a variable set equal to zero for all observations except 1995-
1996, when it was set equal to the Republican vote share in that state in the 1996 election, 
another variable that is all zeroes but for 1991-1994 (when it was set equal to the Republican 
state vote share in the 1992 presidential election), and similar variables for the 1988 election 
(1987-1990), the 1984 election (1983-1986), the 1980 election (1979-1982), and the 1976 
election (1977 and 1978). 
85. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 46, at 225-26. 
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of misspecification,86 or simply noise. 
In sum, given the sensitivity of these results to rather small and sometimes 
arbitrary changes, one has little reason to prefer the conclusion that the death 
penalty will save lives to the conclusion that scores will die as a result of each 
execution. 
A. Problems with Invalid Instruments 
We now turn to evaluating in greater detail the instrumental variables 
procedure employed. Recall that the instrumental variables procedure yields 
valid results if the raw number of prison admissions, police payrolls, judicial 
expenditures, and the Republican presidential vote share in each state provide 
“experiments” which change the deterrence variables, but are not related in any 
other way to the homicide rate. If these variables are good instruments, then 
they should be correlated with the endogenous deterrence variables: the 
probability of arrest for murder, the probability of receiving a death sentence 
conditional on murder arrest, and the probability of execution given death 
sentence. It seems fairly clear that each of these instrumental variables will be 
correlated with crime rates; however, the credibility of this exercise depends 
vitally on whether the sole mediating links are changes in the murder arrest rate 
and application of the death penalty. This is a much tougher case to make. 
While these identifying assumptions are untestable in many applications, in this 
case there are a number of approaches we can take to examine their plausibility. 
The top panel in Table 8 simply replicates Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and 
Shepherd’s main estimates (again showing the estimates as the number of lives 
that will be saved per execution). Recall that if the identifying assumptions are 
true, variation in the instruments should not affect the homicide rate, except 
through its influence on executions. In Panel B, we restrict the sample to those 
observations occurring when the state did not have the death penalty.87 As 
such, there is no way for changes in the instruments to yield useful experiments 
changing the execution rate for this subsample. Thus, Panel B can be thought of 
as depicting the “effect” of “exogenously” executing prisoners in states that 
have no death penalty (an obvious oxymoron).88 The number of state-year 
observations in which there is no death penalty is rather limited—about one-
fifth of the sample—and hence the coefficients are not quite as precisely 
 
86. That is, it may be that the relationship between the endogenous deterrence 
variables and the exogenous instrumental variables varies across states, rather than that the 
relationship between homicide and deterrence varies. 
87. To generate our Panel B estimates, we first run the first-stage regression. Then, we 
drop all observations for which the state is operating under a legal death penalty regime and 
run the second-stage regression on this subset of the data. 
88. Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd’s instruments would pass this test of validity if 
there was no correlation between the instruments and homicide rates in states without the 
death penalty. Panel B of Table 8 shows that this is not the case. 
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estimated. Nonetheless, the effects are positive in five of the six columns and 
tend to be larger than the effects estimated for the full sample (Panel A). The 
most obvious interpretation is that the instruments (or their correlates) affect 
homicide rates directly—through channels other than death row—and hence 
that the assumption required for these instrumental-variables estimates to be 
valid is violated. 
Table 8: Estimating Net Lives Saved per Execution: Exploring the Validity of 
the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (DRS) Instrumental Variables, 1977-
1996 
Dependent Variable: Annual Homicides per 100,000 Residentsc,t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Panel A: Replication of DRS, Implied Life-Life Tradeoff(a) 
Net Lives 
Saved 
36.05*** 
(5.83) 
19.70*** 
(3.32) 
51.99*** 
(5.14) 
18.45*** 
(4.43) 
36.27*** 
(1.94) 
33.26*** 
(4.01) 
 Panel B: “Effects” in State-Years in Which There Is No Death Penalty 
Net Lives 
Saved 
74.00** 
(29.62) 
71.48*** 
(8.80) 
163.87*** 
(21.64) 
-70.06*** 
(15.40) 
103.01*** 
(5.34) 
108.07*** 
(14.98) 
 
Panel C: Restricting the Instrumental Variables to Police Payrolls, 
Judicial Expenditure, and Prison Admission(b) 
Net Lives 
Saved 
-85.57*** 
(13.72) 
-36.81 
(28.30) 
-71.95*** 
(14.91) 
-52.30*** 
(9.15) 
-23.00*** 
(8.14) 
-85.67*** 
(13.62) 
 Panel D: Restricting the Instruments to the Republican Vote Share(c) 
Net Lives 
Saved 
429.43*** 
(21.16) 
81.98*** 
(4.56) 
286.45*** 
(11.06) 
288.76*** 
(15.66) 
53.06*** 
(2.24) 
242.29*** 
(9.33) 
Notes: Panel A replicates Panel B of Table 7, showing the DRS estimates of 
the number of net lives saved per execution. Specification and data are from 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 11, at tbls.3-4. For further details, 
see notes to Table 7. Panel B tests the DRS assumption that their instruments 
only affect homicides through their effect on executions by showing that the 
predicted number of executions are highly correlated with murder rates even 
in states with no executions. Panel C shows that if one does not use the 
Republican vote share as an instrument, the death penalty leads to more 
murders, while Panel D shows that using only the Republican vote share 
variables as instruments, the apparent beneficial effect of the death penalty 
skyrockets. 
 (a) Implied life-life tradeoff reflects net lives saved evaluated for a state 
with the characteristics of the average death penalty state in 1996. 
 (b) Panel C regression includes the Republican vote share variables as 
controls, but not as instruments. 
 (c) Panel D regression includes police payrolls, judicial expenditure, and 
prison admissions as controls, but not as instruments. 
 
There exists an alternative way to test the validity of instrumental 
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variables, based on Jerry Hausman’s overidentification test.89 The logic of an 
overidentification test is that if the “experiments” in deterrence generated by 
the instrumental variables are valid, then the results from one set of 
experiments should be similar to those from another set of experiments. The 
specific system of equations offered by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd 
cannot be estimated unless they have three instruments (because they need at 
least one exogenous instrument for each of their three endogenous variables); 
they actually employ four separate instruments (or nine, if the six Republican 
vote-share variables are counted separately). Thus, an overidentification test 
essentially suggests that if these instruments are all valid, then the coefficients 
should remain stable as we drop some subset of the instruments. Shepherd 
discusses these regressions, stating that “tests for overidentification indicate 
that the model is correctly specified and employs valid instruments.”90 We 
subjected these models to a battery of overidentification tests and could not find 
any evidence consistent with this claim. For instance, Panel C shows what 
happens when the partisanship variables are no longer regarded as 
instruments.91 We see that the “experiments” generated by the combined forces 
of police payrolls, judicial expenditures, and prison admissions suggest that 
more executions lead to substantially more homicides. Panel D shows the 
complementary set of regressions: the six partisanship variables are retained as 
instruments, but police payrolls, judicial expenditures, and prison admissions 
are included as control variables. The variation induced by these variables 
yields dramatically different and implausibly large estimates of the deterrent 
effect of the death penalty. 
The massive change in these coefficients suggests that at least some of 
these instrumental variables are not valid instruments. The large deterrent effect 
noted in their baseline regressions appears to be driven entirely by the partisan 
variables. As an aside, recall that Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd received 
their county data from John Lott, who had created the dataset to examine the 
impact of laws affording the right to carry concealed handguns. Like Lott, 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd use the exact same Republican vote-share 
variables as instruments in their analysis. In so doing, Lott was implicitly 
assuming that this political variable was influencing homicide only through its 
impact on arrest rates and the likelihood of adoption of a right-to-carry 
concealed handgun law. But in using the same Lott instruments, Dezhbakhsh, 
Rubin, and Shepherd assume that the political variables only influence crime 
rates through their effect on murder arrests, death sentences, and execution. 
Thus, it seems difficult to reconcile the competing assumptions made by these 
 
89. See Jerry A. Hausman, Specification Tests in Econometrics, 46 ECONOMETRICA 
1251 (1978). 
90. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 46, at 227. 
91. That is, we include the partisanship variables as control variables—in both first- 
and second-stage regressions. 
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two sets of authors about how this political variable influences crime in a 
state.92 In fact, Shepherd has used three of the four Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and 
Shepherd instruments—police expenditure, judicial expenditure, and 
percentage voting Republican in the last presidential election—as instruments 
in analyzing the deterrent impacts of three other legislative measures: 
California’s strike-based sentencing scheme on crime,93 truth-in-sentencing 
legislation,94 and sentencing guidelines.95 The use of the same instruments in 
multiple studies underscores that the requirements for valid instrumentation of 
the death penalty must be violated if these instruments are influencing crime 
through these other avenues unrelated to execution. 
An additional way to test whether variation in these instruments causes (or 
reflects) changes in crime markets not mediated by the death penalty (thus 
invalidating the crucial identifying assumption) is to test whether the variation 
in executions generated by them is correlated with other crimes for which the 
death penalty does not apply. We have run these separate regressions using 
each of the FBI index crimes as individual dependent variables, but otherwise 
applying the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd specification.96 The results are 
not encouraging for Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd, as they suggest that 
executions cause more rape, assault, burglary, and larceny, and less auto theft 
and homicide; the effects on robbery are inconclusive. In terms of statistical 
significance, the relationship between the homicide and execution rates is 
typically less reliable (statistically significant) than that between the execution 
rate and rape, aggravated assault, burglary, and larceny.97 
 
92. As a further aside, note that Rubin and Dezhbakhsh rerun Lott’s analysis, applying 
these same variables as instruments for concealed handgun laws, referring to this method as 
“more appropriate.” Paul H. Rubin & Hashem Dezhbakhsh, The Effect of Concealed 
Handgun Laws on Crime: Beyond the Dummy Variables, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 199, 206 
n.11 (2003). 
93. Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of 
California’s Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (2002). 
94. Joanna M. Shepherd, Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate Sentencing: 
The Truth About Truth-in-Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & ECON. 509 (2002). 
95. Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Criminals Like Us? Risk Attitudes, Sentencing 
Guidelines, and Increased Crime (Emory Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-03, 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=370421 (last visited Dec. 4, 2005). 
96. For obvious reasons, we need to drop aggravated assault and robbery as controls 
when either is the dependent variable; for other index crimes and in all other respects, we 
leave their specification unchanged. 
97. Note that Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd discuss this approach directly in their 
paper: 
We also repeat the analysis, using as our dependent variable six other crimes: aggravated 
assault, robbery, rape, burglary, larceny and auto theft. If executions were found to deter 
other crimes besides murder, it may be the case that some other omitted variable that is 
correlated with the number of executions is causing crime to drop across the board. However 
we find no evidence of this. Of the thirty-six models that we estimate (six crimes and six 
models per crime), only six exhibit a negative correlation between crime and the number of 
executions. These cases are spread across crimes with no consistency as to which crime 
decreases with executions. 
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Given the apparent problems with these instrumental-variables estimates, it 
seems reasonable to try to figure out what is going on and to see whether the 
estimates are consistent with their theory. Specifically, Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and 
Shepherd provide a theoretical rationale for their instruments: 
Police and judicial-legal expenditure . . . represent marginal costs of 
enforcement. More expenditure should increase the productivity of law 
enforcement or increase the probabilities of arrest, and of conviction, given 
arrest. Partisan influence is used to capture any political pressure to “get 
tough” with criminals, a message popular with Republican candidates. . . . 
Prison admission is a proxy for the existing burden on the justice system; the 
burden may affect judicial outcomes.98 
Table 9 reports the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd first-stage 
regressions—always a useful diagnostic, but something not shown in their 
paper. For brevity, we simply show the coefficients from their preferred 
specification (see Model 4 in Table 8). 
Having estimated the first-stage regression, we can compute the (reduced-
form) effects of a change in each of the instrumental variables on the homicide 
rate. This value is shown in the final column, which comes from multiplying 
the coefficient in each column by the coefficient of the relevant instrument in 
the second-stage regression. Note that contrary to their theorizing, increases in 
police spending and judicial spending are associated with a higher murder rate. 
Moreover, the coefficients on the Republican share of the vote in the six 
individual elections—which we saw in Panel C of Table 7 to have such a 
powerful effect on the deterrence estimates—change substantially from election 
to election. That is, the effect on deterrence policy of having more Republican 
voters bounces back and forth across various elections, again counter to the 
theoretical rationale that Republican majorities would be tougher on crime. 
Moreover, these estimates bounce around in a particularly counterintuitive 
manner: increased voting for Reagan in 1980 was associated with a deterrent 
effect, while the effects of Reagan in 1984 were equal and opposite; increased 
voting for Bush in 1988 was associated with an antideterrent effect, while states 
voting strongly for Bush in 1992 had the opposite result. 
 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 365 n.21. That is, while they claim that 
six of thirty-six estimates showed a significant pseudo-deterrent effect and were spread 
across crimes with no consistency, we found six of six estimates for auto theft and two of six 
robbery estimates yielded significant pseudo-deterrent effects. Moreover, they neglected to 
mention that all six rape estimates, all six assault estimates, four of six robbery estimates, all 
six burglary estimates, and all six larceny estimates yielded a statistically significant pseudo-
antideterrent effect. Both the pseudo-deterrent and pseudo-antideterrent estimates suggest 
that the instrumental variables are correlated with other developments in crime markets, 
which would render them invalid instruments for Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd’s 
analysis. 
98. Id. at 357. 
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Table 9. Do the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd Instruments Have the 
Predicted Effects on Endogenous Deterrence Variables in Their First-Stage 
Regressions? (1977-1996) 
 Dependent variable 
 
Probability 
of Arrest 
Probability of 
Death 
Sentence 
Given Arrest 
Probability of 
Execution 
Given Death 
Sentence 
Net Effect 
on 
Homicide 
Rate(a) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Police Spending 0.03 (0.023) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.05*** 
(0.004) 0.08 
Judicial Spending -0.22
***
 
(0.034) 
0.01*** 
(0.001) 
-0.04*** 
(0.006) 0.58 
Prison Admission 0.01
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.000) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) -0.04 
1976 * Republican 
Vote Share (Ford) 
-0.66** 
(0.311) 
0.03 
(0.083) 
0.49*** 
(0.053) 0.08 
1980 * Republican 
Vote Share (Reagan I) 
0.16 
(0.202) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.02 
(0.036) -0.45 
1984 * Republican 
Vote Share (Reagan II) 
-0.64*** 
(0.196) 
0.04*** 
(0.004) 
0.29*** 
(0.035) 0.54 
1988 * Republican 
Vote Share (Bush I) 
-0.25 
(0.216) 
0.06*** 
(0.004) 
-0.03 
(0.038) 0.41 
1992 * Republican 
Vote Share (Bush II) 
-0.04 
(0.215) 
0.05*** 
(0.004) 
0.14*** 
(0.039) -0.45 
1996 * Republican 
Vote Share (Dole) 
-0.82*** 
(0.212) 
0.01** 
(0.004) 
0.96*** 
(0.040) -0.77 
N 48,070 51,143 57,637  
 Second Stage 
Coefficients -2.27
***
 
(0.50) 
-3.62 
(14.53) 
-2.71*** 
(0.62)  
Notes: Using the data, source, and specification from supra note 11, at 363 
tbl.4, Model 4, this table illustrates the impact of the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and 
Shepherd instrumental variables on the three endogenous deterrent variables 
(Columns 1 through 3) and on homicide rates (Column 4). Contrary to their 
articulated rationale for these instruments, police spending, judicial spending, 
and Republican vote share in 1976, 1984, and 1988 correlate with higher 
murder rates. The police and judicial spending variables are expressed in 
billions of dollars. Coefficients on prison admissions and vote share variables 
have been multiplied by 1000 and 100, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses, and ***, **, and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% or 
10%, respectively. 
 (a) Column 4 is a simple calculation reflecting the direct effect of a change 
in each independent variable on the homicide rate, as mediated through each 
of the endogenous variables. That is, Column 4 is the sum of the first stage 
coefficients multiplied by the corresponding second-stage coefficients (listed 
in the bottom row). 
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B. Problems with Statistical Significance 
At this point we have shown that the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd 
results are highly sensitive in a range of dimensions and that both the sign and 
magnitude of the estimates vary wildly. From a statistical standpoint, what is 
most surprising is that each estimate—while often dramatically different from 
other estimates—also appears to be estimated quite precisely. That is, the 
standard errors on all of these results are quite small, and the statistical 
significance of the results quite substantial. This invites the inference that the 
statistical significance of these results is considerably overstated. 
To better illustrate that the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd model is not 
yielding reliable estimates of the effect of an additional execution on murder, 
we ran the following experiment using their preferred specification as our base 
model. We took the time series of the independent variables for each county 
and matched it to the time series of the homicide rate for a random county. 
Thus, the independent variables are, by construction, unrelated to the dependent 
variables (conditional on year fixed effects).99 We then ran the Dezhbakhsh, 
Rubin, and Shepherd regression (using their preferred Model 4) and collected 
the relevant coefficients. We repeated this process 1000 times and, hence, 
generated the distribution of the estimated effects across 1000 instances in 
which there is no true underlying relationship. 
Figure 7 depicts the probability density function of these estimates, and 
highlights where the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd central estimate falls in 
this distribution. In these experiments, the uncorrelated data yielded 
coefficients at least as large as their estimate 30% of the time, and it yielded 
coefficients with an absolute value at least this big 56% of the time. That is, 
this exercise suggests that even if there is absolutely no relationship between 
the death penalty and murder, there is a substantial probability that the 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd model will, by chance, generate results 
suggesting there is a large and statistically significant effect. By contrast, the t-
statistic that they reported (t = 4.4) suggests that under the same null, estimates 
as large as theirs occur less than 0.001% of the time.  
It is now well known that there are at least two problems with the standard 
errors that Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd report. First, the data are highly 
autocorrelated, which leads to substantial underestimates of standard errors 
(and thus overestimation of precision). To explain briefly, this year’s homicide 
and execution rates often closely resemble last year’s, and so to treat the two 
observations as independent experiments would understate uncertainty about 
the relationship between the two. Second, despite the fact that the dependent 
 
99. Formally, this is a randomization test, using block randomization. See BRYAN F.J. 
MANLY, RANDOMIZATION, BOOTSTRAP AND MONTE CARLO METHODS IN BIOLOGY (2d ed. 
1997). We also obtained qualitatively similar results when randomizing the residuals instead 
of the independent variable, as suggested in Peter E. Kennedy, Randomization Tests in 
Econometrics, 13 J. BUS. ECON. STAT. 85 (1995). 
DONOHUE & WOLFERS 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 1/9/2006 12:41:22 PM 
834 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:791 
variable is measured at the county level, the independent variables of interest in 
these regressions are measured at the state level. If there are state-specific 
shocks through time—reflecting factors like unmodelled changes in state 
policies, changes in state criminal markets, and the like—then this again will 
lead standard OLS methods to overstate their precision. The intuition is that by 
disaggregating to the county level, one might gain a false sense of security that 
each county provides an independent experiment, when counties within a state 
are likely to be subject to correlated shocks. 
Both of these facts are already well understood in the empirical 
literature,100 and indeed, Eric Helland and Alex Tabarrok have made these 
points quite explicitly regarding Lott and Mustard’s investigation of the right-
to-carry concealed handgun laws.101 The exercise depicted in Figure 7 provides 
one way of assessing statistical significance in light of autocorrelation, but it 
does not further take account of the correlation across counties within the same 
 
100. See Brent R. Moulton, An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of 
Aggregate Variables in Micro Units, 72 REV. ECON. & STAT. 334 (1990) (on clustering); 
Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan, supra note 45 (on autocorrelation). 
101. See Eric Helland & Alex Tabarrok, Using Placebo Laws To Test “More Guns, 
Less Crime,” 4 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1 (2004). Given that the Dezhbakhsh, 
Rubin, and Shepherd data are a near-identical version of the Lott and Mustard data and that 
the structure of their estimating equations is similar, it seems natural to suspect that the same 
issues arise. 
Figure 7. Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (DRS) Distribution of 
Estimates Under the Null of No Deterrent Effect 
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state. As such, we followed Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil 
Mullainathan102 and reestimated the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd models, 
correcting the standard error estimates to take account of correlation both 
across counties within states and within states and counties through time. These 
adjustments obviously do not change the estimated coefficients, and thus the 
estimated life-life tradeoff for Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd’s preferred 
Model 4 remains at 18.5. However clustering by county leads the standard error 
to rise from 7.1 to 37.6, and clustering by state leads the estimated standard 
error to rise further to 51.3; block-bootstrap standard errors yielded similar 
estimates. That is, the 95% confidence interval around their central estimate 
ranges from the suggestion that each execution causes 82 more murders to each 
execution saving 119 lives. 
Some of these same problems with statistical inference recur in Paul 
Zimmerman’s 2004 study.103 While several aspects of his approach are similar 
to those of Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd, there are two important 
differences: he exploits state-level data (over the sample from 1978 to 1997), 
and he uses a different set of instrumental variables. Specifically, Zimmerman 
argues that characteristics of homicides affect the resolve of the authorities to 
apply the death penalty, and so he employs variables describing homicides in 
the current and previous year as his instrumental variables.104 Analyzing the 
subset of variation in executions that is correlated with his instruments, 
Zimmerman’s preferred estimate suggests that each execution saves 19 lives, 
and his reported 95% confidence interval ranges from 7 to 31 lives. While we 
cannot test his identifying assumption (although we may be skeptical about it), 
we can test whether his results reflect chance, or a more fundamental 
correlation. Using Zimmerman’s data, we reran his regressions so as to correct 
the standard error for clustering within states through time; we also estimated 
block-bootstrap standard errors. These exercises suggested that the true 95% 
confidence interval runs from each execution causing 23 homicides to each 
preventing 54 homicides. 
 
102. See Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan, supra note 45, at 249. 
103. See Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 163. 
104. Thus, Zimmerman’s instruments include: an indicator for whether an offender 
was released from death row in the previous year; an indicator of whether there was a 
botched execution in the previous year; and both contemporaneous and once-lagged values 
of the proportion of murders committed by strangers, by nonwhites, and under nonfelony-
related circumstances. Of course if certain classes of homicides simply vary more than 
others, their share in the total will be directly correlated with the homicide rate, invalidating 
the use of these variables as instruments. 
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VI. A PARTIAL RECONCILIATION: LACK OF STATISTICAL POWER AND 
REPORTING BIAS 
Our analysis of the effects of judicial and legislative experiments yielded 
quite inconclusive results. Neither adoption nor abolition of the death penalty 
could reliably be causally linked to homicide rates. Our reanalysis of Katz, 
Levitt, and Shustorovich’s data shows that even with the largest samples 
analyzed in the literature, it is difficult to isolate any robust correlation between 
homicide rates and changes in the intensity with which the death penalty 
applies. That this is true even when analyzing data from fifty states over the 
period from 1934 through 2000 is perhaps surprising, although this could be 
taken to buttress the view that the true effect is reasonably close to zero. 
A set of studies has analyzed execution data over much shorter, more 
recent (post-moratorium) time periods and purports to find reliable 
relationships between executions and homicides.105 While the published 
estimates in this set of studies point to a deterrent effect, our reanalysis shows 
that small changes in specifications, samples, or functional form can 
dramatically change the results. Indeed, several of the more expansive 
specifications point to an antideterrent effect of the death penalty. What then is 
to be made of this highly volatile set of estimates? Unless one has a particularly 
strong prior belief about the “correct specification” (and we do not believe that 
economic or econometric theory are sufficiently well developed here that one 
would be warranted), one cannot confidently conclude that the evidence points 
to either deterrent or antideterrent effects. The difficulty in drawing strong 
conclusions is not simply one of the statistical (in)significance of the estimates: 
even when coefficient estimates are plagued by wide confidence intervals, they 
are still informative as to the “most likely” effects of the death penalty; yet, the 
“most likely” effect varies too widely across specifications to provide much 
guidance. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that any study based only on recent U.S. data 
can find a reliable link between homicide and execution rates. Figure 8 
illustrates the difficulty facing researchers fixated on recent data, showing 
execution rates from 1934 to 2002 for the twelve largest states (accounting for 
around 60% of the U.S. population). The clear message is that there has been 
very little variation in execution rates since 1960 with which to reliably 
estimate any effects. Among these twelve states, there were very few 
executions between the early 1960s and the mid-1990s, and since then, only 
Texas and Illinois provide much variation. Moreover, the difficulty of finding 
reliable estimates is exacerbated by the fact that homicide rates typically show 
tremendous volatility both year to year and decade to decade. 
The difficulty of discerning reliable correlations between execution policy 
 
105. See Dezhbakhsh, Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 11; Mocan & Gittings, supra 
note 11; Zimmerman, supra note 11. 
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and homicides becomes even sharper when attempting to use instrumental 
variables methods to isolate causal effects because these methods focus on only 
the subset of the variation in executions that is deemed “exogenous.” For most 
plausible sets of instrumental variables, only a small number of executions can 
be thought of as yielding the sorts of “experiments” that this method requires, 
so it is commensurately more difficult for these estimates to yield robust and 
significant estimates. Indeed, in the previous Part we saw that realistic 
approaches to measuring the standard errors in existing instrumental-variables 
estimates pointed to an extremely large degree of uncertainty about their true 
effects. 
All told, estimates in the existing literature appear to be quite fragile in 
light of small changes to specification, sample, or functional form. Estimates 
from a variety of approaches yielded different signs and vastly different 
magnitudes, a pattern of results that is at least partly reconciled by more 
appropriate treatments of standard errors suggesting that much of this is natural 
sampling error. All of this said, Sunstein and Vermeule’s reading of the 
literature led them to see a persistent pattern of robust deterrent effects reported 
in these same papers. What explains this disjunction? One possibility is simply 
that the published estimates are a nonrepresentative sample of the wider 
universe of estimates that we have sought to present. If this were true, then 
even a careful reading of published results would suffer from a simple sample 
selection bias. 
“Reporting bias” refers to the possibility that published results are an 
Figure 8. Execution Risk by State: Twelve Largest States
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unrepresentative sample. There are several reasons why this might occur. The 
“file drawer problem” refers to the tendency of researchers not to report on 
approaches that “didn’t work out,” in the sense of not yielding statistically 
significant estimates. Alternatively, “publication bias” arises when journals 
only publish estimates that meet standard tests of statistical significance. “Data 
mining” or “specification search” may also occur if career-driven or 
ideologically motivated researchers face incentives to report specifications that 
yield statistically significant evidence or estimates in favor of their preferred 
position. That said, it is worth emphasizing that reporting bias may occur 
without any of the authors being aware of it: they might simply want to report 
useful findings, and evidence falsifying a null hypothesis is typically regarded 
as more valuable. 
Fortunately, we can test for reporting bias.106 The intuition for this test 
begins by noting that different approaches to estimating the effect of executions 
on the homicide rate should yield estimates that are somewhat similar. That 
said, some approaches yield estimates with small standard errors, and hence 
these should be tightly clustered around the same estimate, while other 
approaches yield larger standard errors, and hence the estimated effects might 
be more variable. Thus, there is likely to be a relationship between the size of 
the standard error and the variability of the estimates, but on average there 
should be no relationship between the standard error and the estimated effect. 
By implication, if there is a correlation between the size of the estimate and its 
standard error, this finding suggests that reported estimates comprise an 
unrepresentative sample. One simple possibility might be that researchers are 
particularly likely to report statistically significant results, and thus they only 
report on estimates that have large standard errors if the estimated effect is also 
large. If this were true, we would be particularly likely to observe estimates that 
are at least twice as large as the standard error, and therefore coefficient 
estimates would be positively correlated with the standard error. 
In Figures 9 and 10, we compile each of the reported estimates of the 
average number of homicides prevented per execution in recent state or county 
panel-data studies, as well as the reported standard errors. To ensure that this 
sample is representative of the literature, we included all of the reported panel 
data estimates from the various papers cited by Sunstein and Vermeule, a list 
that coincides with Shepherd’s congressional testimony.107 
 
106. See Orley Ashenfelter, Colm Harmon & Hessel Oosterbeek, A Review of 
Estimates of the Schooling/Earnings Relationship, with Tests for Publication Bias, 6 LAB. 
ECON. 453 (1999). 
107. Compiling the sample still involved some judgment calls. Our goal was to include 
all comparable aggregate estimates for the average impact of an execution on homicide rates 
across death penalty jurisdictions. Thus, we included the Mocan and Gittings, supra note 11, 
estimates of the effects of commutations or death row removals as estimates of the effects of 
an execution foregone, but we omitted the Paul R. Zimmerman, Estimates of the Deterrent 
Effect of Alternative Execution Methods in the United States, 65 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 
DONOHUE & WOLFERS 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 1/9/2006 12:41:22 PM 
December 2005] USES AND ABUSES OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 839 
Recall that if there is no reporting bias, then estimates of the effects of 
executions should be clustered around the same mean, albeit in a “cone” shape, 
as the variability of estimates rises (linearly) with the standard error. Moreover, 
there should be as many estimates in the top half of the cone as in the bottom 
half, and the estimated effect should be uncorrelated with the standard error. 
Instead, these data are strongly consistent with evidence of reporting bias. 
Figure 9 shows the “central” or “preferred” estimate from each study, and its 
corresponding standard error.108 
First, note that the reported estimates appear to be strongly correlated with 
their standard errors: we find a correlation coefficient of 0.88, which is both 
large and statistically significant. Second, among studies with designs that 
yielded large standard errors, only large positive effects are reported, despite 
the fact that such designs should be more likely to also yield small effects or 
 
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=355 
783, estimates of the effects of execution broken down by execution method, the Shepherd, 
Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 46, estimates broken down by state, and the 
Shepherd, Murders of Passion, supra note 46, estimates of the effect of executions on 
particular homicide types (although we include the aggregate estimates). 
108. The central estimates are from Dezhbakhsh, Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 
363 tbl.4, col.1; Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra note 33, at tbl.7, col.1; Katz, Levitt & 
Shustorovich, supra note 10, at 327 tbl.2, col.6; Mocan & Gittings, supra note 11, at 464 
tbl.2, col.1; Shepherd, Murders of Passion, supra note 46, at 310 tbl.3, col.1; and 
Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 183 tbl.4, col. 2. 
Figure 9. Reporting Bias in Estimated Effects of Executions on Homicide: 
Preferred Estimates Across Six Studies
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even large negative effects. And third, we observe very few estimates with t-
statistics smaller than two, despite the fact that the estimated deterrent effect 
required to meet this burden rises with the standard error. 
Moreover, while Figure 9 focuses only on the central estimate from each 
study, Figure 10 shows the pattern of estimated coefficients and standard errors 
reported within each study. Typically these various estimates reflect an author’s 
attempt to assess the robustness of the preferred result to an array of alternative 
specifications. Yet within each of these studies (except Katz, Levitt, and 
Shustorovich) we find a statistically significant correlation between the 
standard error of the estimate and its coefficient, which runs counter to one’s 
expectations from a true sensitivity analysis. 
In light of this analysis, it is probably not surprising that our sensitivity 
tests—sampling from the universe of unreported results—yielded more 
frequent and larger negative (that is, antideterrent) estimates and far more 
fragile estimates of the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Moreover, to the 
extent that we report only small deviations from a set of specifications that are 
likely afflicted by reporting bias, future researchers sampling from a wider 
array of econometric specifications and samples may find even more 
conflicting signals. 
In sum, if the death penalty had a sufficiently powerful effect on murder 
rates (in either direction), we are confident that it would emerge from panel 
Figure 10. Reporting Bias in Estimated Effects of Executions on 
Homicide: Reported Estimates Within Each Study
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data across all fifty states over a nearly seventy-year period. Relatively small 
effects—either stimulating or deterring homicide—will be hard to tease out, 
though, given the wide swings in homicide rates. Indeed, these wide swings 
might lead researchers to find spuriously large effects in small subsets of the 
data. 
We are led to conclude that there exists profound uncertainty about the 
deterrent (or antideterrent) effect of the death penalty; the data tell us that 
capital punishment is not a major influence on homicide rates, but beyond this, 
they do not speak clearly. Further, we suspect that our conclusion that 
econometric studies are highly uncertain about the effects of the death penalty 
will persist for the foreseeable future. Quite simply, it is difficult to foresee any 
states providing a sharp enough policy shock for social scientists to reliably 
estimate an effect on homicide rates.109 Consequently, we strongly suggest that 
substantial caution is required in interpreting any studies purporting to show 
that recent data can speak more clearly than earlier studies allowed. 
CONCLUSION 
We have surveyed data on the time series of executions and homicides in 
the United States, compared the United States with Canada, compared non-
death penalty states with executing states, analyzed the effects of the judicial 
experiments provided by the Furman and Gregg decisions comparing affected 
states with unaffected states, surveyed the state panel data since 1934, assessed 
a range of instrumental variables approaches, and analyzed two recent state-
specific execution moratoria. None of these approaches suggested that the 
death penalty has large effects on the murder rate. Year-to-year movements in 
homicide rates are large, and the effects of even major changes in execution 
policy are barely detectable. Inferences of substantial deterrent effects made by 
authors examining specific samples appear not to be robust in larger samples; 
inferences based on specific functional forms appear not to be robust to 
alternative functional forms; inferences made without reference to a 
comparison group appear only to reflect broader societal trends and do not hold 
up when compared with appropriate control groups; inferences based on 
specific sets of controls turn out not to be robust to alternative sets of controls; 
and inferences of robust effects based on either faulty instruments or 
underestimated standard errors are also found wanting. 
Whether or not the death penalty has a deterrent effect is—as Sunstein and 
Vermeule rightly argue—a very important question. If policymakers are willing 
to debate the issue based on the consequences of capital punishment (as 
Sunstein and Vermeule urge them to do), then it is crucial to try to establish 
 
109. For instance, note that the recent Illinois execution moratorium yielded a change 
in execution risk much smaller than the sorts of shocks seen during the first half of the 
century. For more information, see Figure 8, supra. 
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reliable evidence on whether executions deter or stimulate crime. As such, it 
seems reasonable to appeal to econometric pyrotechnics. Unfortunately, our 
survey of the literature suggests that too often these pyrotechnics have yielded 
heat rather than light. 
In general, those interested in policy debates should insist upon clarity and 
intuitive plausibility in all aspects of research design and analysis. This is 
especially true in domains where research may be driven by ideology and 
advocacy motives; these incentives may lead researchers to use econometric 
sophistication to silence debate rather than enlighten policymakers. While 
sophistication holds an obvious allure (especially for academics), intuitive 
plausibility should always be preferred in the realm of real-world policy. 
Unfortunately, the history of the death penalty debate is replete with examples 
of plausibility being sacrificed on the altar of sophistication. 
In many ways, our tour of the recent death penalty literature brings the 
debate full circle to the explosion of interest in the topic almost a half-century 
ago. Thorsten Sellin’s research showed a clear realization of the value of 
conducting before and after comparisons, contrasting “treatment” states with 
“controls” unaffected by policy changes.110 As Sellin recognized, it is 
important to compare effects in jurisdictions that are otherwise subject to 
similar shocks.111 Even so, in 1975 Ehrlich argued instead for sophistication, 
claiming “that the statistical methods used by Sellin and others to infer the non-
existence of the deterrent effect of capital punishment do not provide an 
acceptable test of such an effect.”112 Yet despite the technical sophistications of 
Ehrlich’s approach, he clearly sacrificed plausibility, arguing that he could 
isolate which movements in the aggregate U.S. homicide rates were caused by 
changing execution policy and thereby estimate the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment. The subsequent literature, aptly summarized in a National 
Academy of Sciences report,113 confirmed that Ehrlich’s strong conclusions 
about the deterrent effects of capital punishment were unwarranted. 
A quarter of a century later, a small surge of studies has appeared claiming 
that recent data and new econometric methods overturn the earlier consensus. 
Sunstein and Vermeule appear to believe this claim. Despite the sophistication 
of the studies on which that claim is based, our analysis shows that they either 
fail to account for developments in unaffected states, apply sophisticated 
methods in an entirely inappropriate manner, or yield results which are clearly 
not robust to small changes. Moreover, not only are panel data not “a newly 
available form of data,”114 but they also formed the basis of Sellin’s research 
method. While he did not bury his comparisons in jargon, Sellin’s method 
 
110. See Sellin, Homicides, supra note 1, at 135. 
111. Id. 
112. Ehrlich, supra note 3, at 398. 
113. See DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra note 5.  
114. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 711. 
DONOHUE & WOLFERS 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 1/9/2006 12:41:22 PM 
December 2005] USES AND ABUSES OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 843 
essentially comprised a difference-in-differences approach; in his insistence on 
comparing otherwise similar states, Sellin predicted the subsequent emergence 
of matching estimators. His methods are not only intuitively plausible, but they 
are not too far from the current state of the art in empirical microeconomics.115 
As we have applied somewhat updated econometric techniques to Sellin’s 
methods, we have found that his conclusions remain essentially unchanged. 
The U.S. data simply do not speak clearly about whether the death penalty has 
a deterrent or antideterrent effect.116 The only clear conclusion is that execution 
policy drives little of the year-to-year variation in homicide rates. As to 
whether executions raise or lower the homicide rate, we remain profoundly 
uncertain. 
Sunstein and Vermeule argue that capital punishment is morally required if 
it saves lives. Their assessment of the currently published empirical literature 
leads them to the view that lives would indeed be saved, which in turn prompts 
them to call for an increase in the number of executions. Moreover, they argue 
that it is not sufficient to raise reasonable doubt about the claim that executions 
will reduce the number of murders, as they argue for a version of the 
precautionary principle, and hence “the existence of legitimate questions is 
hardly an adequate reason to ignore evidence of severe harm.”117 
In light of our reanalysis of the data, we would strongly urge them to 
reassess their conclusion about what is known or knowable about the impact of 
the death penalty. And we do not mean simply to raise “legitimate questions,” 
but rather to urge them to reconsider fundamentally whether existing data can 
be sufficiently informative as to form the basis of capital punishment policy at 
all.118 The estimated effects of capital punishment on homicide rates change 
dramatically even with small changes in econometric specifications. 
Aggregating over all of our estimates, it is entirely unclear even whether the 
preponderance of evidence suggests that the death penalty causes more or less 
murder.119 
 
115. David Card and Alan Krueger’s landmark minimum-wage study has been an 
important catalyst for this style of research, and it shares much of the flavor of Sellin’s 
methods. Card and Krueger were interested in the employment consequences of the 
minimum wage, so they examined the evolution of employment in New Jersey, comparing it 
with the evolution of employment among a control group of unaffected firms in eastern 
Pennsylvania. See David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A 
Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 
772, 773 (1994). 
116. Conceivably, a careful study of international statistics might provide richer data 
with which to illuminate the deterrent question, although (depending on which countries are 
examined) this might raise an additional question whether responses to the use of the death 
penalty in countries with very different cultural backgrounds and legal institutions would be 
relevant to the United States. 
117. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 715. 
118. Id. 
119. As such, our conclusions most closely match those of Steven Levitt. For a 
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Alternatively, to frame the issue as a Bayesian would, one’s posterior 
belief about the deterrent effect of the death penalty surely looks a lot like one’s 
prior belief. We can be sure that the death penalty does not cause or eliminate 
large numbers of homicides, but we learn little else from the data. As such, 
there is little evidence to convince believers in the deterrent hypothesis 
otherwise, as there is little to persuade believers in the competing brutalization 
hypothesis. Thus, it remains for Sunstein and Vermeule either to accept that 
their argument provides no useful guidance to policymakers or to argue that the 
death penalty is morally required if one has a strong enough prior belief. In 
light of their suspicions that “cognitive processes contribute to large mistakes, 
at least on questions of fact,”120 one suspects that they would also be led to 
agree that—in light of the highly uncertain evidence—their argument has little 
prescriptive content. 
To the extent that there is a prescription in Sunstein and Vermeule’s 
argument, it is to emphasize the importance of a direct interplay between crime 
research and (highly politicized) policymaking. Unfortunately, recent history 
on this score is not particularly encouraging. Isaac Ehrlich’s econometric 
evaluation of the deterrent effect of the death penalty breathed new life into the 
pro-death penalty movement. Even though Ehrlich’s 1975 study was to be later 
discredited, the real problem was not that a flawed empirical paper had been 
written, but rather that there were those who leapt to use it as a tool to advance 
the goal of reinstating capital punishment in the United States before the 
validity and reliability of the work had been fully explored. In the words of the 
National Academy of Sciences report on Ehrlich’s work: “[I]t seems 
unthinkable to us to base decisions on the use of the death penalty on Ehrlich’s 
findings, as the Solicitor General of the United States has urged. They simply 
are not sufficiently powerful, robust, or tested at this stage to warrant use in 
such an important case.”121 More recently, numerous legislators, and even 
former Attorney General John Ashcroft, have been willing to rely on the 
findings of John Lott122 as constituting powerful evidence that right-to-carry 
 
particularly sharp articulation, see Douglas Clement, Does the Death Penalty Deter 
Homicide? New Economic Studies Seek the Answer to an Age-Old Question, REGION, June 
2002, available at http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/02-06/debate.cfm. Clement reports: 
 “What’s interesting about this is that it mirrors so closely the Ehrlich debate of the ‘70s,” 
said Chicago’s Levitt, “which basically all came down to if you tweak his specification at all, 
you get numbers that are totally different.” And reaching a definitive answer about deterrence 
could well be impossible since current execution rates may be too low to provide sufficient 
empirical data. “I really think not that the answer is ‘yes’ or ‘no,’” said Levitt, “but that 
there’s not enough information to figure it out. There may never be enough. It may just be a 
question that can’t be answered.” 
Id. 
120. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 740. 
121. DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra note 5, at 358.  
122. JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN 
CONTROL LAWS (2d ed. 2000). 
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laws would save lives.123 It was only subsequent to the legislative and judicial 
debates that a consensus emerged in the scientific community, and in each case 
the early research did not withstand the scrutiny of a National Research Council 
report.124 
These episodes suggest the potential dangers awaiting those who might 
wish to short-circuit the full process of scientific inquiry and validation and 
rush directly to the legislative forum when initial empirical findings seem to 
support a favored policy position. Lamentably, studies that were later utterly 
discredited continue to influence policy since the evidentiary burden required to 
reverse course appears to be high. In our view, Sunstein and Vermeule are a bit 
cavalier in thinking that we can start down a path of greater reliance on the 
death penalty today and then turn away from it if the evidence later proves that 
there is no effect (or even a pernicious effect). It is far better to insist on a 
stronger foundation of statistical proof before advancing a policy position, 
particularly one that the polity may be predisposed to embrace without regard 
to the degree of social scientific support. 
As Hashem Dezhbakhsh—the lead author of the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and 
Shepherd study—argued with respect to John Lott’s work: “The academic 
survival of a flawed study may not be of much consequence. But, 
unfortunately, the ill-effects of a bad policy, influenced by flawed research, 
may hurt generations.”125 While Dezhbakhsh was referring to John Lott’s 
research on guns, his insight is equally applicable to the debate over capital 
punishment. 
 
123. In 2002, eighteen state attorneys general referenced Lott’s work in a letter to 
Attorney General John Ashcroft supporting his interpretation of the Second Amendment as 
protecting the right of individuals to bear arms. See Letter from Bill Pryor, Alabama 
Attorney General, to John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General (July 8, 2002), available at 
http://www.ago.state.al.us/ag_items.cfm?Item=81; see also 146 CONG. REC. S349 (daily ed. 
Feb. 7, 2000) (statement of Sen. Craig); 145 CONG. REC. H8645 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1999) 
(statement of Rep. Doolittle). 
124. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 
(Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2004). 
125. Hashem Dezhbakhsh, First Person: More Guns, Less Crime? Hashem 
Dezhbakhsh Disagrees, EMORY REP., Sept. 27, 1999, available at http://www.emory.edu/ 
EMORY_REPORT/erarchive/1999/September/erseptember.27/9_27_99dezhbakhsh.html.  
DONOHUE & WOLFERS 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 1/9/2006 12:41:22 PM 
846 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:791 
 
